Case summaries

If an application for protection has been heard at first instance and the applicant there had the opportunity of a full examination including a personal interview and was given a transcript or report of the interview; and if it was there determined that the application is manifestly unfounded; then EU asylum law in particular Directive 2013/32/EU allows the national court or tribunal to dismiss an appeal without allowing the applicant  a further opportunity to be heard.

However, a hearing may be conducted if the court hearing the appeal considers it necessary for the purpose of ensuring that there is a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, as required under Article 46(3) of the Directive.

The Court rejected the Applicant's challenges to the respondent's decision to certify his asylum claim and deport him, on the grounds (i) of his mistaken assessment of his probable situation if deported to Italy, (ii) of his misreading of the Dublin III Regulation, specifically insofar as it applies to effective remedy.   

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN). The OIN based its decision on classified information obtained from the Constitutional Protection Office (CPO), which stated that the Applicant poses a threat to Hungary’s national security, and that he shall not be granted protection, with due regard to Article 1 f) c) of the Geneva Convention. The OIN failed to communicate the CPO’s opinion to the Applicant for nine months. The Court assessed that the proceedings were ‘exceptionally unlawful’.

Asylum authority’s decision regarding the application of the safe third country principle quashed. The Court pointed out that the application of the STC principle is ‘absolutely unacceptable.’

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) because it failed to carry out a proper establishment of facts as required by the Dublin III Regulation.

In order to protect the security of state and public order, it is justifiable to limit freedoms and rights, including the right to court. The right to court covers the possibility to access case files by the party of the proceedings as well as the possibility to get to know the motives of the decision and formulate allegations against them. When there is a need to protect the security of state and public order, the rights of the party of the proceedings are limited. The party cannot get to know the motives of the decisions and has to rely on the fair judgement of the authority.

The courts as well as the administrative authorities got to know the motives of the decision and had a possibility to verify them in the context of the legal conditions in return proceedings. Their assessment is binding and sufficient. Assessment of the authorities is subject to control of legality in administrative court proceedings, so it cannot be stated that the actions of the authority are out of control.

The Supreme Administrative Court rules that Article 12(1)2 of the Return Directive which allows for non-disclosure of certain facts of the return decision for the reasons of national security is a specific law applicable in return cases and to that extent it excludes the general safeguards envisaged in Article 47 of the Charter.

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) because it did not assess the Applicant’s fear of persecution in a due manner and held that there is a real internal flight alternative in an erroneous way, without due regard to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU)

Limiting the possibility to access classified information to the third country national does not automatically mean that their right to an effective remedy with regard to a return order was infringed. By the same token there has been no infringement of Article 47 of the Charter.

The request for a preliminary ruling reads as follows: “Should Article 32 (3) of the Visa Code interpreted in light of Recital 29 of the preamble and Article 47 of the Charter be understood as creating an obligation for a Member State to guarantee the right to an effective remedy before a court?”

In the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court the wording of Article 32 (3) of the Visa Code does not provide clarity as to whether the EU legislator intended to give the term “appeal” the meaning of any measure envisaged in national law or to give the right to an effective remedy before a respective court. If the CJEU, in the preliminary reference proceedings, states that the right to “appeal” should be exercised before a court, the national law excluding judicial control with regard to the Consulate’s decisions refusing the issuance of a visa would be contrary to Article 47 of the Charter, as well as the principle of equivalence and effectiveness.