Case summaries

The legislative prohibition on the right to work for those seeking international protection, for a period of over 7 years, does not breach the right to earn a livelihood under the Constitution, nor does it violate rights codified in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or the right to private life under the European Convention on Human Rights.

This is the subsequent Supreme Court ruling following the preliminary reference ruling by the CJEU in C-604/12 in relation to the examination of subsidiary protection within the asylum procedure in Ireland. The case also addresses the legality in EU law of the two stage procedure in Ireland and the lack of a single asylum procedure.

In light of the provisions of Article 5 Dublin III Regulation, which serve to protect the asylum seeker in a Dublin transfer, the individual subject to a Dublin transfer decision must be seen to have a subjective right to a personal interview. Before such an interview, which must take into account the subjective perspective of the individual, has been conducted in a manner which meets the criteria of Article 5 of Dublin III, the authorities cannot conclude that no obstructions to the removal are present. 

The right to be represented by a lawyer in the context of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 will only apply when an appeal to a return decision has been lodged and free legal assistance will be subject to national domestic legislation. 

This CJEU ruling concerned the interpretation of Article 6 of Directive 2008/115/EC (‘the Return Directive’) in relation to the right to be heard prior to a return decision being made, to return illegally staying third-country nationals.

It was found that where the national authority had explicitly provided for the obligation to leave national territory in cases of illegal stay in its national legislation and the third-country national had properly been heard in the context of the procedure for examining his/her right to stay; the right to be heard did not require the applicant to be given an additional opportunity to present observations prior to the issue of a return decision. 

Three third country nationals applied for lawful residence in the Netherlands and sought access under the Directive 95/46 (the Data Protection Directive) to an official administrative document (a ‘minute’) containing legal analysis in relation to the decisions on their applications.

The CJEU found that the legal analysis in itself did not constitute ‘personal data’ within the meaning of the Directive and as such there had been no infringement of the applicants’ right of access to data. In addition, Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that the applicant for a residence permit cannot rely on that provision against the national authorities, as it is not addressed to the Member States. 

The case concerns the interpretation of Directive 2004/83 and clarifies that the Irish legislation requiring seekers of international protection to follow two separate procedural stages: application for refugee status, and in case of refusal, application for subsidiary protection, is not contrary to EU law if the two applications can be introduced at the same time and if the application for subsidiary protection is considered within a reasonable period of time.

The right to good administration includes the right of any person to have his or her affairs handled impartially and within a reasonable period of time.

The provisions of the Asylum Procedures Directive have been fully transposed into the CESEDA. A decision of the OFPRA based on all the documents/ evidence submitted by the applicant in support of his subsequent application without an interview does not infringe Article 41(2) of the Charter. When OFPRA considered the subsequent application, it was legitimate for it to have rejected the application without any interview since the new documents/ evidence provided were without merits. The Court found that M.A’s application must be rejected without any need to re-examine the facts he submitted, including those in his first application. The application of M.A was rejected.

In determining the lawfulness of continued detention after a breach of defence rights, the domestic authorities must ask whether, in light of all factual and legal circumstances, the outcome of the administrative procedure at issue could have been different if the third-country nationals in question had been able to put forward information which might show that their detention should be brought to an end.

This case related to a dispute as to whether the UK or Belgium had responsibility for determining the applicant’s asylum claim