Case summaries
The Foreigners and Borders Service (SEF) appealed against the judgment of the Administrative Court of Sintra, which had upheld the application for annulment of the order of the National Director of SEF - holding that the application for asylum made by the defendant was inadmissible and held that Italy was the State responsible for taking back the applicant - and had ordered SEF to admit, process and assess the applicant's claim, with a final decision.
The Central Administrative Court of the South dismissed the appeal, confirming the contested decision on the ground of a real and proven risk of the applicant suffering cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment.
In order to guarantee that an applicant for international protection has an effective judicial remedy within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter, a national court or tribunal is required to vary a decision of the first-instance determining body that does not comply with its previous judgment. The court or tribunal must substitute its own decision on the application for international protection by disapplying, if necessary, the national law that prohibits it from proceeding in that way.
A Guinean woman who has been forced into marriage at a young age and subsequently harassed into marrying her late husband’s brother, is a refugee under article 1, section A §2 of the Geneva Convention. She risks being persecuted by reason of her membership in the social group of women, and considering the regular violation of women’s rights occuring in Guinea.
The State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) must carry out an individualised examination to determine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the asylum procedure of the Member State where the applicant shall be transferred to has systemic weaknesses that would entail a risk of inhuman treatment or chain deportation.
The Court recognised self-defence in a case where migrants were charged with assault against a police officer following their rescue at sea and their impending return to Libya. Their well-founded fear of return to Libya provided the basis for their defence of duress.
The transfer of a family to the previous country of entry (Bulgaria), which might entail the risk of refoulement to the country of origin (Afghanistan), would cause an irreversible and serious harm; it ordered the suspension of the transfer decision until the final decision, on the annulment of the rejection of the application on the refugee status, was issued.
Article 21(2) of the directive precludes Member States from issuing a measure of refoulement or expulsion against the persons covered by one of the scenarios described in Article 14(4) and (5) of Directive 2011/95 if this would expose the concerned persons to the risk of their fundamental rights as enshrined in Article 4 and Article 19(2) of the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU.
The Court decides that Greece is responsible for the examination of the applicant’s claim for international protection. The Court does not find that asylum procedures in Greece are flawed and that the applicant will be exposed to inhuman and degrading reception conditions. Moreover, neither the fact that the applicant’s sister is living in Germany nor the purpose of medical and psychological support in a Member State entitles the applicant under the Dublin Regulation to choose which country will examine his application for international protection.
The CJEU ruled that a third-country national who lodged an application for international protection in a first Member State, then left and subsequently lodged a new application in a second Member State is not entitled to rely, in an action brought under Article 27(1) DRIII in that second Member State against a decision to transfer them, on the criterion for defining responsibility stablished in Article 9. To conclude otherwise would not be in conformity with the Regulation’s general purpose to prevent secondary movements of individuals and the principle that an application for international protection must be assessed by a single Member State.
The CJEU also concluded that in the cases referred to in Article 20(5) DRIII, a possible transfer could occur without previously having been established that the requested Member State is responsible for examining the application. This is because the exercise of a take back request does not presume the responsibility of the requested Member State to examine the application, but that that Member State satisfies the conditions laid down in Article 20(5) or 18(1) (b) to (d). Adding to that, in a situation covered by Article 20(5), a Member State cannot issue a take back request when the applicant has provided reliable information establishing that that Member State must be regarded as responsible for the application.
There is a case of urgent necessity concerning interim measures according to § 123 VwGO obliging a Member State to accept a take charge request regarding the asylum applications of family members of a person entitled to subsidiary protection in that state when the decision on an asylum application of these family members is imminent in the requesting state.