Case summaries

An Applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State pending a final decision on his asylum status prevails over the public’s interest in immediate enforcement of an ordered transfer if the appropriate asylum procedure of an Applicant in the country to which the Applicant would be deported cannot be ensured (Hungary). 

The Dublin regulations do not allow for priority to be given to the processing of different types of transfer applications. In particular, there is no priority which favours a transfer application made on the Applicant’s own initiative as compared to one which is ordered by administrative compulsion. In deciding the application, the executing authority must allow the Applicant to transfer without administrative compulsion if it appears certain that (i) the Applicant will voluntarily travel to the Member State responsible for reviewing his application and, (ii) will report in a timely manner to the responsible authority. A transfer without administrative compulsion is not a deportation (Abschiebung), and therefore does not result in a statutory ban on entry and residence under Sec. 11 of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz).

When balancing the applicant’s right to family reunification and the protection of the rights of others in relation to the welfare of the state, which would be lessened if the application for family reunification were approved, the Supreme Court favours the latter since according to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, countries enjoy a certain margin of appreciation when protecting the right to family life. 

The Austrian asylum authorities have to consider every possible breach of Art. 3 ECHR (or Art. 4 CFREU respectively) when examining a Dublin transfer. A possible breach can be linked to personal circumstances of the asylum seeker and does not necessarily have to be caused by a systemic failure of the asylum system in the receiving country. A Dublin transfer is forbidden if there is a real risk of a breach of Art. 3 ECHR.

A single mother and her five minor children must be considered as particularly vulnerable and cannot be transferred from Austria to Hungary.

The appeal against the transfer of an asylum seeker from Germany to Hungary in the accelerated Dublin procedure is granted and suspensive effect applied to the decision. The applicant may face a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment because of systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in Hungary following the entry into force of new Hungarian laws on 1 August 2015, and because of the risk of further removal to Serbia.

The Austrian asylum authorities have to consider accurately and comprehensively the changes in the legal situation and the development of the actual situation of asylum seekers in Hungary when deciding on a Dublin transfer to this country.

An application to establish the suspensive effect of a pending appeal pursuant to Section 80, Paragraph 5 of the German Code of Administrative Court Procedure (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung – VwGO) is not a legal remedy under Article 20, Paragraph 1 (d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (“Dublin II Regulation”). A German court’s dismissal of a Section 80, Paragraph 5 application does therefore not suspend the 6-month deadline under Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the Dublin II Regulation for a member state of the European Union (“Member State”) to transfer an applicant to a Member State that has accepted (actually or  implicitly) a request to take charge. 

Non-Citizen children of the State have rights protected by the Constitution when in the State, including rights under Article 41, 42 and 40.3. However, the right to reside in the State is a protection under Article 40.3 which is reserved for Irish citizen children. It is the citizenship of the child that confers this right to live in the State under Article 40.3.

The best interests of the child are considerations that must be assessed when deciding upon a deportation order for a child. However, as the Convention on the Rights of Child has been ratified by Ireland but has not been implemented as part of domestic law, the Court is not bound to view the best interests of the child as the primary consideration.

The court overturned a decision to transfer the Applicant to his first country of asylum, Italy, on the grounds that the Prefect failed to demonstrate that Italy would have given the Applicant the relevant assurances as to appropriate reception conditions.

The court took into account the personal circumstances of the Applicant. The Tribunal found that the Prefect’s arguments were not adapted to the circumstances of the Applicant and were too general to demonstrate that transferring the Applicant to the Italian authorities would not have a substantial impact on the Applicant’s fundamental rights and the right of asylum in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 known as “Dublin III” (the “Dublin III Regulation”)  Dublin III Regulation.

The Court expressed doubts as to whether it is constitutionally permissible to base the withdrawal of subsidiary protection on a “final conviction of a crime” without taking the circumstances of the individual case into account. The Austrian provision might not be in line with the requirements as set out by the European Union Directive 2004/83/EC and might therefore be unconstitutional.