Case summaries

There was no serious reason, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Qualification Directive, to rule out with sufficient confidence that the risk of persecution, from which it is established that the applicant suffered, would not be repeated.

A nexus between an act of persecution and the persecution ground is only necessary to meet the definition of a refugee, but not, however, to determine the question of whether persecution (an act of), and therefore a reason against rejecting the application for international protection, was raised during the procedure at the airport.

This was an appeal against the rejection of an application for asylum before the Appeal Committees formed pursuant to Articles 26 and 32 of Presidential Decree 114/2010; and against the Minister for Citizen Protection's decisions 5401/3-498356 dated 11.2.2011 and 4000/1/67-f dated 18.5.2011. The rejection of the application (and the legal consequences arising from the rejection) was an excusable error, due to the body issuing the decision having adopted misguided practices. The fear of persecution was based on  membership of a particular social group. The domestic violence endured by the Applicant in the form of psychological stress and physical violence at the hands of her husband, in conjunction with the absence of State protection, constitutes a type of gender based persecution because those actions are detrimental to human dignity and physical integrity. Similarly, her non-conformist behaviour meant that she was exposed to the State's strict laws and practices which imposed disproportionately harsh punishment on women accused of having sexual relations outside marriage.

It was held that the implementation of laws (which may be derived from traditional or cultural norms and practices such as Sharia) which conflict with international human rights standards, and also the disproportionately harsh punishment imposed for non-compliance with a policy or for violation of a law (punishment, indeed, which shows gender based discrimination) could constitute persecution.

The imposition of corporal punishment by judicial and administrative authorities is contrary to the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Applicant's disproportionately harsh punishment by whipping or even stoning is considered to be torture and constitutes a serious form of persecution since the right to not be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment is a protected right which is not subject to any exceptions. The prohibition of torture (Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 3 of the Convention against Torture) is absolute, and a grave violation of absolute rights is, undeniably, persecution.

The importance of preserving family unity is emphasised, taking into consideration the Final Act of the Conference which adopted the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Preamble to Directive 2004/83/EC.

The applicant was recognised as a refugee because of a threat of forced marriage in Afghanistan. The court found that rights violations resulting from forced marriage, including the use of physical and psychological violence, constitute severe violations of basic human rights according to Art. 9 (1) (b) of the Qualification Directive. The applicant belonged to the particular social group of "unmarried women from families whose traditional self-image demands a forced marriage." The Afghan State is neither willing nor able to protect women against persecution in case of forced marriage. Internal protection was not available to the applicant.

This case concerned the exclusion from refugee status of a former Baath party member. The fact that the applicant had previously held a position in the Iraqi military, was one of the Defence Minister's advisers and one of Saddam Hussein's closest men, was, on the evidence before the Court, considered insufficient to meet the requirements for exclusion from refugee status.

Following the decision of Abdulla et al. (C-175/08) of the European Court of Justice, revocation of refugee status presupposes that a significant and non-temporary change of circumstances has taken place. This is the case if the factors which formed the basis of the recognition of refugee status, may be regarded as having been permanently eradicated. The relevant standard of probability for the determination of the likelihood of future persecution is the same both for the recognition and the revocation of refugee status, i.e. a change in circumstances has to be assessed on the basis of whether there is still a "considerable" probability of persecution (change from former case law).

In applying Art 12 of the Qualification Directive concerning exclusion from refugee status, the decision-maker is required to conduct an individual assessment of the applicant’s circumstances and, specifically, of his own complicity, if any, in crimes against humanity.

Prostitutes who come from the State of Edo, and who are both victims of human trafficking and anxious to extricate themselves actively from these networks, form a group whose members are, by reason of these two common characteristics which define them, likely to be subjected to persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, without being able to avail themselves of the protection of the Nigerian authorities. They are members of a particular social group.

Women who are subjected to the norms and customary laws of FGM and forced marriage in rural areas in Nigeria cannot avail themselves of the protection of the State authorities, and their attitude is perceived as an infringement by the community members. They therefore form a social group within the meaning of Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Furthermore, the impossibility of marrying another person constitutes an obstacle to leading a normal life in another part of the country and an alternative protection alternative cannot be considered. 

The applicant could not substantiate the individual elements of his claim with respect to his well-founded fear of a blood feud; however, he was able to satisfy the criteria for subsidiary protection. As a result of the armed conflict that was ongoing in the respective province in his country of origin (Ghazni, Afghanistan), the high intensity of the indiscriminate violence was deemed to be sufficient to be a threatening factor to the applicant’s life. As a result, the criteria of subsidiary protection were fulfilled.