Case summaries

This case concerned the right to an effective remedy; the Court considered that the remedy of judicial review in Irish law is an effective remedy within the meaning of Art 39.1 of the Procedures Directive.

The applicant applied to the Minister to be readmitted to the asylum system many years after he had made a first application for refugee status which had been refused for non-attendance at a refugee interview. There was no new claim as such nor was there any new evidence to support the application. The Court found that the Minister was only required to decide whether what was adduced was ‘new’. The Minister’s obligation was not altered by the fact that the original application had not been fully processed but had been abandoned by the applicant and deemed withdrawn. An applicant is not entitled to exploit his own failure to prosecute his original application in order to compel the Minister to consent to what is, in effect a reopening of the original claim with no new evidence, argument elements or findings. The Court also found that Art 32 of the Procedures Directive did not assist the applicant and, in any event, there was no claim of ‘direct effect’ made on his behalf.

The Supreme Administrative Court considered the application of the internal protection principle. The Court held inter alia that effective protection cannot be provided by non-governmental organisations which do not control the state or a substantial part of its territory.  

M’s detention pending deportation, for over 2 years and 8 months, was processed without sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness and delay, resulting in four separate violations of the Convention.

The General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order, having had an application for asylum referred back to it, considered whether the submitted evidence was “new and crucial”. If so, an ab initio examination of the application would be ordered. Failure to give notification of an act does not affect its validity, but only the start of the deadline for submitting an application for its annulment. The copy of the Turkish Government Gazette which promulgated the decision regarding withdrawal of the Applicant's nationality, was new and crucial evidence. There was no justification for refusing the request for an ab initio examination of the Applicant's circumstances, nor for rejecting his application to remain in the country on humanitarian grounds.

The MOI and the Regional Court were correct in dismissing a minor applicant's claim for international protection relying on the fact that both parents applications were rejected.

Conversion to Christianity led to a re-examination of impediments to enforcement.

Subsidiary protection was granted to the applicant due to the lack of his family ties in Afghanistan on the basis of the risk of serious harm (torture and inhuman treatment).

Since the situation of generalised violence which prevailed in Sri Lanka ended with the military defeat of LTTE combatants in May 2009, the only valid ground for claiming subsidiary protection would be Article L.712-1 b) Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive]. The applicant has to establish an individual risk of persecution or ill-treatment in case of return to his/her country of origin.

This case concerns whether the Tribunal correctly applied the test for internal flight and / or state protection.