Case summaries
The physical border around the enclave of Melilla is conformed by two fences and the intermediate zone created between them. The Spanish military police (Guardia Civil) considers that until a migrant has not overcome the second fence he or she has not entered into Spanish territory and therefore, Spanish law, including the Organic Act 4/2000 on the Rights and Liberties of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration (“Aliens Act”), does not apply to a migrant apprehended in the intermediate zone.
The Court ruled that, although this interpretation may violate international law, since there is no clear definition under Spanish law of where the border is located, the direct refusal of migrants who have reached the intermediate zone, does not constitute an administrative prevarication offence.
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the detention conditions on the island of Chios, the detention centre of Tychero and the north of Greece, where a minor Palestinian was held, were not in breach of article 3 of the Convention.
In addition, the Court did not accept that the applicant’s right to liberty and security (article 5) and right to an effective remedy (article 13) had been violated.
The Act on International Protection (AIP) does not provide for a legal basis to deprive an asylum applicant of their liberty (which is the case when the applicant is placed in a closed centre for irregular migrants, termed the “Centre for Foreigners”), but only for the restriction of movement (which can be the case when the movement is restricted to the area of the reception centre for asylum seekers).
Issuing a negative decision in asylum proceedings by the Polish Refugee Board results in an obligation to leave the territory of Poland. Such an obligation is not formulated directly in the decision itself, but is based on the legal provisions in place. Therefore, the present decision does pose a direct threat of irreparable consequences for the applicant.
Granting temporary protection, by suspending the decision under which the applicant is obliged to leave the territory, allows for the standards of fair trial and the right to court (which covers the right to a fair trial as well as the right to have the case examined, including to be delivered by a ruling), thus going further than just the right to have the case examined.
An asylum seeker, submitting his claim to a non-competent authority is considered to be staying illegally in the territory of Greece and falls within the scope of the provisions on detention of Directive 2008/115/EC and Law 3907/2011 for returning illegally staying third-country nationals for as long as his identity remains unconfirmed. The deadline for the referral of his application to the competent authorities begins when the applicant provides assistance, as dictated by his duty to cooperate, with regards to the verification of his identity.
This is the subsequent Supreme Court ruling following the preliminary reference ruling by the CJEU in C-604/12 in relation to the examination of subsidiary protection within the asylum procedure in Ireland. The case also addresses the legality in EU law of the two stage procedure in Ireland and the lack of a single asylum procedure.
Where a foreign or stateless person is on the border and wants to apply for international protection, the competent authorities have the duty to give him information about how to access the procedure. The competent authorities also have the duty to ensure translation support in order to facilitate access to the procedure of asylum. If these duties are not fulfilled both the decree of removal and the decree of detention are void.
An excessive length of the procedure (in this case 2 years and 5 months) for examining the jurisdiction for the application for international protection, which is not caused by the protection seeker himself, leads to an obligation of the Member State to decide the case itself (“duty of self-entry”). Thus this Member State has jurisdiction for the application for international protection to guarantee a fast and efficient procedure within the Dublin III-Regulation.
Detention pending Dublin transfer can only be ordered on the basis of Article 28 Dublin-III-Regulation, which contains autonomous provisions on the detention of foreigner. Additional criteria laid down by national laws are required in order to specify the condition of "risk of absconding". A deportation detention order that does not even refer to Art. 28 Dublin-III-Regulation is unlawful.
The case is a referral back to the CNDA from the Council of State in no. 350661 where the Council had found the CNDA to have erred in law in a previous appeal (no. 10012810) by finding that Nigerian women, who were victims of human trafficking networks and who had actively sought to escape the network, constituted a social group within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The CNDA found that victims of trafficking from the Edo State do, indeed, share a common background and distinct identity which falls within the definition of a particular social group. The applicant was given refugee status.