Case summaries

An Applicant with Syrian citizenship applied for asylum in Sweden. The Migration Court of Appeal found that (i) Armenia was considered a safe third country, and (ii) that the Applicant had such a connection to Armenia that it was reasonable for the Applicant to go there, given that the Applicant’s mother was from Armenia, Armenian was the Applicant’s native language, the Applicant was born and spent his first years in Armenia, and the Applicant had voluntarily returned to Armenia as an adult to study. The Applicant’s asylum application was rejected.

The statement that the applicant can relocate within his country of origin is based solely on general information on Ukraine, without paying attention to his personal circumstances and conditions in the places he could be expected to settle in.

In the decision there is no reference to the applicant’s age, occupation, family situation, employment and housing opportunities, as well as his registration and the level of assistance he could benefit from if returned. The burden of proof to show that the personal circumstances of the applicant are not sufficient to counter a refusal of international protection on the basis of the internal protection alternative lies with the State authority.

The main question is whether the applicant can be sure that he will obtain assistance allowing for certain standards of living. The state assistance is significant here, as the applicant has no family or friends in the part of the country of origin under control of Ukrainians.

General situation in the country of origin, however difficult, does not justify granting refugee status, if there is no or only some small risk of persecutions (such risk can never be actually eliminated). However the authority is obliged to individually assess the situation of a particular applicant. This is not possible without careful examination of all the letters submitted by the applicant during the proceedings before the first and the second instance. Failure to do this cannot be validated by the Court by determining the facts on its own, since it would lead to de facto depriving the applicant of his right to have the case examined in two administrative instances.

An application to establish the suspensive effect of a pending appeal pursuant to Section 80, Paragraph 5 of the German Code of Administrative Court Procedure (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung – VwGO) is not a legal remedy under Article 20, Paragraph 1 (d) of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 (“Dublin II Regulation”). A German court’s dismissal of a Section 80, Paragraph 5 application does therefore not suspend the 6-month deadline under Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the Dublin II Regulation for a member state of the European Union (“Member State”) to transfer an applicant to a Member State that has accepted (actually or  implicitly) a request to take charge. 

Non-Citizen children of the State have rights protected by the Constitution when in the State, including rights under Article 41, 42 and 40.3. However, the right to reside in the State is a protection under Article 40.3 which is reserved for Irish citizen children. It is the citizenship of the child that confers this right to live in the State under Article 40.3.

The best interests of the child are considerations that must be assessed when deciding upon a deportation order for a child. However, as the Convention on the Rights of Child has been ratified by Ireland but has not been implemented as part of domestic law, the Court is not bound to view the best interests of the child as the primary consideration.

Tigere (T) appealed against a decision that the legislation which prevented her from obtaining a student loan was compatible with her human right to education under Article 2 Protocol 1 and Article 14 ECHR. To qualify for a loan, the legislation specified that a student had to (a) be settled (i.e. not subject to immigration laws/restrictions) in the UK when the academic year began; (b) be ordinarily resident in England; (c) been ordinarily resident (i.e. “lawfully”) in the UK for the three years before the start of the course; and (d) their residence in the UK under ‘(c)’ was not at any point for full-time education. T was judged not to have met criteria (a) and (c).

This Case examines the refusal to grant refugee status to a Nepalese national. The Tribunal failed to provide clear, cogent reasoning for the decision. Documentation and explanations provided by the Applicant were not included in the decision. Unreasonable assumptions were made by the Tribunal including: as the Applicant’s wife, children and brother were safely residing in the country of origin, this inferred that the Applicant could do the same; since the applicant spent 6 years living safely in India, he could continue to live there safely. The High Court criticised the procedural approach by the Tribunal and the lack of coherent reasoning provided. The High Court granted leave and quashed the Tribunal’s decision.

The court overturned a decision to transfer the Applicant to his first country of asylum, Italy, on the grounds that the Prefect failed to demonstrate that Italy would have given the Applicant the relevant assurances as to appropriate reception conditions.

The court took into account the personal circumstances of the Applicant. The Tribunal found that the Prefect’s arguments were not adapted to the circumstances of the Applicant and were too general to demonstrate that transferring the Applicant to the Italian authorities would not have a substantial impact on the Applicant’s fundamental rights and the right of asylum in accordance with Article 3 of Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 known as “Dublin III” (the “Dublin III Regulation”)  Dublin III Regulation.

The case follows on from litigation presented in M.A. v Cyprus and focuses in on the legal grounds for detention in Cyprus for an applicant who is subject to removal as well as an individual’s right to speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of detention. 

In order to justify detention, the Ministry must establish that there is a real risk that the applicant will abscond and that this is not simply a presumption. The results of the bone tests can be put to the side if the judge believes that it is impossible to determine the age of the applicant in this manner.