Case summaries
The absence of an individual right of the applicant to challenge the determination of the State responsible to examine their asylum claim on Dublin II grounds does not prohibit the autonomous application of ECHR Article 8 to decisions to remove persons from one Member State to another. However, taking into account the significance of the Regulation and the need to preserve its effectiveness, an especially compelling case would have to be demonstrated to deny removal following a Dublin II decision. When the Secretary of State has certified such human rights claims as clearly unfounded, it must be shown that the same decision could have been reached on reasonable grounds by an immigration judge.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the referral of an appeal under the Dublin III Regulation to an administrative agency breaches an applicant’s right to efficient remedy.
An asylum applicant can be sent to a Safe Third Country by a Member State who has admitted responsibility under Dublin III in the context of a take back request, where the applicant has left the responsible Member State before a decision on the first asylum application has been taken on its merits.
The absence of information being provided to the sending Member State by the receiving Member State on the latter’s legislation and practice regarding STC does not prevent an asylum applicant being sent to a STC or breach an applicant’s right to an effective remedy
Where an applicant has been taken back by a responsible Member State there is no obligation on the State to re-open the examination of the application at the exact point where it was left.
The decision of denying asylum is disproportionate, as the fact that the acts of persecution are indiscriminate and affect a large majority of the population do not exclude the application of the 1951 Convention when the necessary elements of the provision are present. The reports of UNHCR were also noted in the Court’s assessment, particularly regarding the risk groups that the organisation has characterised.
The appeal procedure dealt with the question of whether the complainant is to be classified as a minor according to Article 2 lit. g of the Dublin III Regulation, with the consequence that Article 8 para. 1 of the Dublin III Regulation is applicable and the complainant can therefore remain with her sister in Switzerland. In particular the term “legally present” and the procedure of taking evidence were discussed in depth.
The concept of family life under Article 8 ECHR and under the Portuguese Constitution requires the existence of an effective connection between the individuals, which also presupposes the existence of a financial interdependency.
In case of conflict between a domestic and international norm the Court is obliged to adhere to the latter and set aside the former. Given the well-established right to an effective remedy in international and European instruments, an element of which relates to the remedy’s timeliness, the court is obliged to remake the OIN’s subsidiary protection decision and provide the applicant with refugee status. This conclusion applies notwithstanding that domestic legislation prohibits the Court from reforming an OIN decision. To abide by this legislation would result in a never-ending appeal procedure thereby rendering the remedy ineffective.
An applicant from Kosovo claimed persecution due to his homosexuality. His application was rejected. The Administrative Court dismissed the action, but the Supreme court annulled the judgement and returned the case to the new procedure. An act of persecution does not depend on the applicant reporting persecution (in this case rape) to the police of their country of origin.
The principle of material continuity applies to the transition from one form of aid to another. A family who has been granted international protection should be accomodated in reception centers for refugees until they benefit from financial assistance and a stable private housing, even if it means extending the deadline to fins accommodation that had been given to them following their recognition as refugees.
The applicants are Afghan nationals married religiously in Iran when the first applicant was 14 years old and the second applicant 18 years old. When they applied for asylum in Switzerland a year later, the Swiss authorities did not consider them as being married and the second applicant was subsequently expelled to Italy. They alleged that this expulsion constituted a violation of their Article 8 ECHR right to respect for family life. The Court found that the Swiss government had been justified in finding that they were not married, and held that the decision to expel the second applicant was not a violation of Article 8.