Case summaries

The Federal Administrative Court rules, that the significant risk of absconding for ‘Dublin-detention’ orders must always be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The sole existence of a ground for detention as set out in Art. 76a(2) AuG does not automatically indicate a significant risk absconding. Such an order is unlawful and must be rescinded. The Court ‘warns’ the SEM that the current practices are very concerning and require adaptation.

The Federal Administrative Court (the “Court”) suspended its decision and referred the case to the European Court of Justice (“CJEU”) pursuant to Art. 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) to obtain a preliminary ruling with regards to the following question:

Do the provisions of Regulation No. 604/2013 (“Dublin-III-Regulation”) 

i)  the obligation of a Member State to (re-)file a request to take back the applicant with another Member State; and

ii) the possible transfer of the responsibility for examining an application,

apply in relation to an applicant who has been deported to the Member State where he had first entered the EU and illegally re-enters the Member State that had filed the request to take back and deported the applicant.

The 6-month period under Art. 29 (1) Dublin-III -Regulation begins after the request by another Member State to take charge or to take back the person concerned has been accepted or the fiction of such acceptance (Art. 29(1) first alternative) or of the final decision on an appeal or review where there is a suspensive effect in accordance with Article 27(3) (Art. 29(1) second alternative). In the second case, the later event determines when the time limit begins to run, unless the time limit for the transfer triggered by the acceptance of the request to take back or to take charge has already expired. In such a case, the latter event is decisive to determine when the period begins, unless the 6-month period triggered by the (deemed) acceptance had already expired. 

If a Member State is responsible for carrying out an asylum procedure under the relevant terms of the Dublin Regulation, e.g. under Art. 29 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation, an applicant may invoke that Member State’s responsibility if it has not been positively established that another Member State (which does not have responsibility) is willing to take charge of the applicant or take him or her back.

In such a case, it can be derived from the objective and purpose of the Dublin system, as well as the fact that it constitutes the procedural dimension of the substantive rights granted to applicants by Directive 2011/95/EU (i.e. Qualification Directive), that the individual concerned is entitled to have his asylum application reviewed by the responsible Member State. This is so, irrespective of the question, whether the provisions on the Member State’s responsibility generally provide for subjective rights of the applicants. 

This case relates to a take back request on grounds of Article 18(1)(d) Dublin III Regulation. Referring to the A-G opinion in Ghezelbash (Case C-63/15), the Court found that Abdullahi (C-349/12) is not applicable to the Dublin III Regulation. Hence,  an applicant could call into question the application of the criteria for determining the responsible Member State in circumstances where a Member State has agreed to take back an applicant for international protection.  

The Supreme Administrative Count in the case concerning housing for a refugee ruled that the applicant, as a refugee, has found herself in a very specific situation, which was not taken into account by the authority. The applicant was not able to submit all the documents and information about the members of the family who stayed in Chechnya in order to obtain housing. It is beyond any doubt that the applicant and her children cannot live with their relatives, because other members of their family are in Chechnya, so the missing information could not have had any influence on the case whatsoever.

The Supreme Administrative Court found that it is the authority which is obliged to establish all the facts and find the objective truth. Although the local act imposes an obligation on the applicant to present concrete evidence, it cannot be stated, that justifiable problems with completing the evidence by the applicant exempted the authority from its own obligation to examine the case and enabled to automatically dismiss the application. Such an understanding would be inconsistent with article 6 of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees.

The judgment examined whether returns of asylum seekers to Bulgaria would be contrary to their Article 3 rights. The court held that the Bulgarian system has significantly improved since the UNHCR report in 2014 which prohibited returns of asylum seekers. As a result the returns would not be in breach of Article 3. 

The administrative court may not replace the State Secretary’s credibility assessment of the asylum claim with his own assessment. The administrative court can, however, express its opinion on the underlying facts submitted by the Secretary of State. 

The three cumulative prerequisites for an internal protection alternative are not fulfilled, as it cannot be reasonably expected of the refugee to settle in the proposed part of the country. The UNHCR’s reasonability test is comparable with the national legislation’s one and UNHCR defines the internal protection alternative as ‘unreasonable’.

The mere fact that the applicant does not have an identity document does not mean that there was a reason for limiting his freedom of movement based on the first alinea of Article 51(1) of IPA (establishment of identity). The mere presumption that the applicant has deliberately thrown the passport away in order to conceal his identity and country of origin does not mean that doubts exists concerning the applicant’s identity. Doubts of the identity of applicants for international protection may exist for example if the applicants change their personal information during the procedure.

Detention of migrants for criminal offences subject to return is lawful even if asylum-seeker status is subsequently acquired. The application of 2008/115/EC is then not mandatory and the detention’s duration is not addressed under Article 5 (1)(f) therefore is to be judged ad hoc.