Case summaries

The Secretary of State had appealed the decision of the FTT (supported by the Upper tribunal) on several grounds of error in law. The Court upheld the tribunal on the issue of whether they had considered the gravity of the respondent’s offences  (section 72 of the 2002 Act); but found that the tribunals had indeed erred when considering the application of Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention, and on the applicability of Article 8 ECHR. They consequently remitted the case of MM’s deportation to the Upper Tribunal for re-examination in its entirety, based on these errors in the previous decisions. The statement of the referral left open for the respondent the possibility of an appeal on the basis of Article 3 ECHR. 

If the applicant comes from a “safe” country, they must be able to prove that there is no protection as understood in the 1951 Geneva Convention, otherwise his application will be rejected. 

The imposition of a "one-off" expedited procedure in France for unaccompanied children wishing to reunite with their family in the UK fell within the framework of the Dublin Regulation. The failure by the UK Secretary of State to give full effect to the Dublin Regulation (most notably Article 17) and the Commission’s Implementing Regulation was unlawful and as a consequence the applicant was deprived of a series of procedural safeguards and protection.

In addition the applicant’s procedural rights have been violated by virtue of the procedural deficiencies and shortcomings during the interview and review stage of the applicant’s request for family union. The lack of adequate enquiry, sufficient evidence gathering and a rushed mechanical decision making procedure meant that the applicant was subject to a process which did not adequately meet his needs.

An applicant may be granted refugee status under Article 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention for fear of persecution based on sexual orientation. This depends on whether or not, according to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin, persons sharing a sexual orientation may be regarded as a social group within the meaning of the Convention.

This case dealt with the issue that arose from the dissenting judgement of Judge Hogan in the case at the Court of Appeal – that is whether the Irish legislative provision preventing (without limitation) an asylum seeker from seeking, or entering, employment in the period before the final determination of his asylum claim was contrary to the right to work under the Irish Constitution and, if it was, to what extent could an asylum seeker claim the benefit of that right in the Constitution and to what extent could the State legitimately restrict that right.
 

The Court rejected the Applicant's challenges to the respondent's decision to certify his asylum claim and deport him, on the grounds (i) of his mistaken assessment of his probable situation if deported to Italy, (ii) of his misreading of the Dublin III Regulation, specifically insofar as it applies to effective remedy.   

It is an appeal against the decision handed down by the Northern Central Administrative Court that denied the request to annul the order issued by the National Director of the Aliens and Borders Service.

The appeal was declared well-founded by the Supreme Administrative Court, considering the disregard of an essential formality that the law prescribes. Therefore, the decision determined the revocation of the judgment under appeal and the annulment of the contested act.

A waiver to file an appeal against custody prior to deportation is only possible under strict conditions. Particularly there has to be a qualified legal representation when signing the waiver.

The risk of absconding in the sense of Art. 76a Residence Act cannot be assumed because of the mere fact that another state is responsible for the asylum procedure of that person.

In contrast to the obligation to provide information to asylum applicants under the Dublin Regulation, Article 18(1) of the Eurodac Regulation has as its sole purpose and effect the effective protection of the personal data of the asylum seekers concerned. The right of asylum seekers to information contributes, together with the right of communication, the right to rectify and erase the data. 

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s four-stage test for the determination of sexual orientation asylum claims, set out in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (“HJ (Iran)”), still held good, specifically the third and fourth stages which draw the distinction between those who would conceal their sexual orientation and whether the material reason for that is fear of persecution or for other reasons.