Case summaries

This was a decision on an injunction application in the course of judicial review proceedings challenging a subsidiary protection decision and deportation order on the basis of a failure by the Minister to cooperate with the applicant in processing the subsidiary protection application and that the failure to provide a mechanism of appeal against a refusal of subsidiary protection  breaches the principal of equivalence in European Union law in that the procedure under the (Irish) 2006 Regulations is inferior to that provided for in national law (the Refugee Act 1996 as amended) in respect of decisions on claims for asylum.

The (injunction) application was rejected on the basis that it was only since the requirements of the Procedures Directive, and, in particular, the deeming provision of its Annex 1, became effective in Irish law (in 2007) that the recommendation of the Commissioner fell to be considered as the first instance determination by a “determining authority” with an appeal to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. Thus, insofar as the provisions of the 1996 Act can now be pointed to as providing a two-stage determination for an asylum application including a right to an effective remedy by way of appeal, it is only because of the manner in which the State has adapted the arrangements of the 1996 Act in order to comply with the requirements of the Procedures Directive for asylum (refugee) applications pursuant to Article 3.1. Furthermore, without a unified system for both applications the minimum procedural standards provide for in the Procedures Directive do not apply to a separate and discrete subsidiary protection application.

In relation to the ‘co-operation’ point the Court found that a claim of non-compliance with such a duty of “co-operation” or the principle audi alteram partem cannot be made as a purely academic point divorced from specific facts. The applicant in this case eschewed the need to identify any particular finding in the Subsidiary Protection determination which might have been corrected or altered had the applicant been consulted upon it.

Unlike the Procedures Directive, Article 4.1 of the Qualifications Directive refers to the duty of co-operation in respect of the “application for international protection,” that is, the claim to asylum and the claim to subsidiary protection. Article 14.2 of the Procedures Directive recognises, however, that the report of the personal interview with the applicant on which the decision of the determining authority on an asylum application is based, may be communicated to the asylum seeker after the decision has been adopted. The Court found that it would be inconsistent with these arrangements that the duty of cooperation in Article 4.1 should be construed as imposing on a determining authority a mandatory obligation to submit either the report or a draft decision in relation to a subsidiary protection application to an applicant for prior comment. Furthermore, the duty to co-operate provided for in Article 4.1only applies to those elements of the claim described in Article 4.2. These are, in effect, the basic facts and documents relating to the applicant’s personal history and to the basis of the claim and they are primarily considered and assessed in the asylum process including any appeal.

This case involved a challenge to the transposition of the Procedures Directive into Irish domestic law which appeared to be barred by a special time limitation period of 14 days applicable to challenges to asylum/deportation decisions. The Court found that a Member State is entitled to apply a national limitation period even in respect of those cases where the Member State in question has failed properly to transpose the relevant Directive, provided that the limitation period complies with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The Court found that the strict 14 day time limit provided for in section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants Trafficking Act, 2000, is not equivalent to the limitation period for judicial reviews in other broadly similar areas (generally 6 months) and is not effective because it is so short a time. In the circumstances, the limitation period could not be pleaded or relied upon against the applicants. 

The withdrawal of practical protection against deportation for subsequent applications is lawful and does not represent an infringement of the right to an effective remedy (Art 13 ECHR), if the legality of the withdrawal is examined by the Asylum Court.

The Applicant submitted applications for the assignment of a legal adviser and legal aid at the same time as his appeal. The Asylum Court rejected the appeal and the applications for the assignment of a legal adviser and legal aid as inadmissible. The Constitutional Court of Austria revoked this finding with reference to Art 15 Procedures Directive: the Asylum Court should not have been permitted to reject the applications for the assignment of a legal adviser and legal aid, but should have pronounced a judgment on the merits by means of a separate decision that could be challenged with a legal remedy.

In the event of an exclusion order, the Reception Conditions Directive (2003/9/EC) does not apply.

This case concerned whether the provisions of the Reception Conditions Directive apply to subsequent asylum applications (fresh claims) as with initial claims for asylum. It was confirmed that that the provisions do apply. 

French legislative provisions concerning the non suspensive effect of the judicial remedy under the accelerated procedure are not manifestly incompatible with the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Reception Conditions Directives.  

This case concerned fair procedures, namely the right of an applicant to an oral hearing of his asylum appeal. The Court held that a fair appeal does not necessarily impute a right to be heard orally.

The accelerated procedure (in this case, applicants from a safe country of origin) guarantees the individual assessment of the applicant’s situation and their right to a remedy with suspensive effect.

This case concerned a decision of the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) to refuse to recommend refugee status on grounds of credibility. The refusal contained a finding which allowed an appeal on the papers only. The applicant sought to have this decision set aside by the High Court on the basis that an appeal without an oral hearing was insufficient as the report depended on a finding of a lack of credibility and thus required oral testimony to rebut this.