Case summaries

It is expected and necessary that persons fearing persecution should fully and continuously cooperate with the authorities handling their case.

Since the life, basic safety and livelihood chances of people are involved, based on the above described amount and nature of danger (in such cases naturally the actual danger need not and cannot be undoubtedly proved) the very likely occurrence of persecution, harm or other significant detriment cannot be risked.

In relation to the internal protection alternative, the Applicant must have family or kinship ties, or his/her basic livelihood and accommodation must be provided by other means in a certain part of the country.

The Applicant was a homosexual male from Iran who had renounced Islam and was studying the catechism of the Roman Catholic doctrine. It was held that the Applicant had no well-founded (objective) fear of persecution on the grounds of changing his religious beliefs.

Regarding the risks associated with his sexual orientation, the fear that the Applicant expressed was deemed to be well-founded, and it was held that not externalising his sexual orientation to avoid danger would, in and of itself, constitute serious harm to his right to respect for his private life and his right to not be discriminated against. Therefore, his refugee status was recognised and he was granted the international protection in the form of refugee status.

Establishing  that an asylum seeker is unconvincing is a matter of assessing the evidence, which can only take place when reaching a decision. The competent authority for international protection is not obliged to notify the Applicant in advance regarding its assessment of the evidence. 

Paragraph 9 of Article 23 of the International Protection Act stipulates that when assessing an application for international protection the Ministry of the Interior (MI) needs to take into account the specific information on the country of origin that is connected exclusively to the matter at hand. This can also include the manner of enforcing laws and other regulations in the country of origin. The fact that the Applicant participated in the protests is indisputable, thus the MI should have obtained specific information on whether Iranian legislation defines participation in protests and getting involved in a confrontation with security forces as an act that could lead to persecution.  

The Afghan applicant was granted subsidiary protection status during the court proceedings. The authority must make sure that the applicant is not at risk of serious harm or persecution in the relevant part of the country, not only at the time the application is assessed but also that this is not likely to occur in the future either. Countries struggling with armed conflicts do not normally provide safe internal flight options within the country, as the movement of front lines can put areas at risk that were previously considered safe.

The court found that a prohibition of deportation under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act (corresponding to Art. 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive) was established due to the existence of a general risk of persecution in case of return to Syria. The Administrative Court, in their assessment of risk, went far beyond the prevailing case law, particularly that of the High Administrative Courts.

A particular mode of persecution cannot be detected in Syria due to the arbitrariness and the juxtaposition of different intelligence services, whose impact cannot be predicted.

A further deterioration of the situation has occurred in light of recent developments and the bloody suppression of the protest movements.

Currently even persons who have not been politically active in exile are, with considerable probability, at risk of being arrested on return, not only for a short period - they are also at risk of torture and other inhuman treatment.

The case involves consideration by the Supreme Court of Ireland of whether or not the Minister for Justice has a discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person who has a deportation order made prior to the 20.10.2006, the date on which the law transposing the Qualification Directive came in to effect in Ireland. The Court overturned a decision of the High Court and stated that the Minister for Justice does not have discretion to consider an application for subsidiary protection from a person with a deportation order prior to the 20.10.2006.

This case concerned fair procedures, namely the right of an applicant to an oral hearing of his asylum appeal. The Court held that a fair appeal does not necessarily impute a right to be heard orally.

A single woman from Nigeria (Urhobo) was eligible for protection from deportation under Section 60 (7) sentence (1) of the Residence Act due to a threat of female genital mutilation (FGM) and forced marriage. The economic and social situation in Nigeria is difficult and tense even for the vast majority of the population. The situation is much worse for single women as women in Nigeria are exposed to multiple discrimination. To a large extent they are under legal incapacity, so that in practice they are only in a position to protect their own interests if they are supported by their family.

This case concerned a challenge to the Tribunal’s conduct of a asylum appeal hearing (alleged pre-judging of the case against the applicant due to an argument with the applicant’s lawyer) as well as the Tribunal’s reasoning (alleged flaws in credibility analysis and failure to share investigative burden with the applicant, as required by UNHCR handbook). The challenge was unsuccessful.

The accusation of a breach of the individual's right to information about the rules and procedures of the refugee status proceedings and about the rights and obligations of the applicant was unfounded, as the application form for refugee status contained this information and was signed by the individual in question to acknowledge that she had been duly informed.

For refugee status to be recognised on grounds of a risk of persecution by non-state actors, it needs to be shown that this risk is linked to persecution grounds listed in the Convention.

'Women subject to domestic violence' do not constitute a social group. The assessment of whether women in Russia constitute a social group within the meaning of the Convention requires an assessment of the actual situation in the country of origin.