Case summaries

This case concerned the assessment of religious persecution. The court found that:

1. Even under the Qualification Directive not every restriction of religious freedom results in persecution within the meaning of asylum law. Whether a measure is tied to religion as a reason for persecution is found within Art 10 of the Qualification Directive; but what right is protected, and to what extent, proceeds from Art 9 of the Qualification Directive.
2. Interference in a core area of religious freedom represents a severe violation of a basic human right within the meaning of Art 9.1 of the Qualification Directive. Whether, and under what conditions, religious activity in public is also included, is a matter of uncertainty under Community law that must ultimately be clarified by the European Court of Justice.

1. The denial of citizenship may represent a severe violation of basic human rights according to Art. 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
2. In assessing the severity of the violation of rights caused by the denial of citizenship, under Art. 4.3 of the Qualification Directive, the individual situation and personal circumstances of the person concerned have to be taken into account.
3. A person is stateless according to Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act, if no state considers him/her as a national under its own law, i.e. a de jure stateless person. For de-facto stateless persons, therefore, a threat of persecution has to be established with reference to the state of their de jure nationality.
4. The habitual residence of a stateless person under Section 3 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Act does not need to be lawful. It is sufficient if the focus of the stateless person’s life is in the country, and therefore the stateless person did not merely spend a short time there, and the competent authorities did not initiate measures to terminate his/her residence.

The term "act of persecution" within the meaning of the Qualification Directive requires that an intentional infringement of a basic right as defined in Art. 9.1 of the Qualification Directive takes place. If the applicant has suffered past persecution (before his/her flight), it is no longer possible to deny refugee status solely on the ground that an internal protection alternative had existed in another part of the country of origin at the time of the flight (change of legal situation in the light of Art. 4.4 of the Qualification Directive).   

The situation in Paktia province in Afghanistan meets the requirements of an internal armed conflict in terms of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. An internal armed conflict does not necessarily have to affect the whole of the country of origin. The concept of internal protection does not apply if the applicant cannot reasonably be expected to reside in another part of the country because of an illness, even if that illness is not life-threatening (epilepsy in the case at hand).

State protection should be assessed in the applicant’s home area, in the absence of an internal relocation alternative.  The Tribunal erred in finding that the fact that the applicant had been raped at her home on 3 separate occasions over a short period by government soldiers had the same effect on assessing future risk as if she had been raped by civilians. The soldiers appeared to act with impunity whereas that would not necessarily be the case for civilians. In assessing future risk past experience was central, as reflected in Art 4(4) of the Qualification Directive and by common sense. 

This case concerned an appeal against the refusal of international protection to an Imam from Kazakhstan who claimed persecution from state actors because of his religion. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Regional Court considered that persecution had not been established, and that the behaviour of the authorities had not been motivated by the applicant’s religious belief of “pure Islam” (this is a term that is used to distinguish themselves from other Muslims). However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) disagreed and found that due to the specific circumstances of the applicant (an Imam) there was a risk of persecution. The Court also stated that refugee status can involve risk that is motivated by more than one reason, so long as one of those reasons is a persecution ground.

The situation in Iraq is not characterised by an armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. In any case, there is no sufficient individual risk for returnees.

The applicant, a lesbian from Iran, was recognised as a refugee. The court found:

1. It is unreasonable for homosexuals to refrain from sexual activities in order to avoid persecution.

2. Although there is no systematic persecution of homosexuals in Iran, there is a considerable risk of detection and persecution.

There are "good reasons" within the meaning of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive to consider that the persecution of ethnic Chechens from Chechnya which was solely based on membership of the group will not be repeated. The standard of Art 4.4 of the Qualification Directive has now replaced the concept of "sufficient safety from persecution" as developed in German case law for refugees who had been subject to persecution before they left their country of origin. 

The High Administrative Court decided that a considerable likelihood of group persecution of Hindus in Afghanistan did not exist. The “density” of recorded acts of violence was too low to justify the assumption that Hindus were facing an accumulation of human rights violations or other measures within the meaning of the Qualification Directive.