Case summaries
Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/83 requires the determining authority, under its duty of cooperation, to obtain up-to-date country of origin information and, where relevant, a medico-legal report on the applicant’s mental health; a breach of that duty does not automatically lead to annulment unless it may have affected the outcome.
Under Directive 2005/85, delays in the asylum procedure cannot be justified by legislative changes and, on their own, do not warrant setting aside a decision absent an impact on the outcome.
Article 4(5)(e) of Directive 2004/83 means that a false statement later explained and withdrawn at the first opportunity does not, by itself, undermine the applicant’s general credibility.
The parents and minor siblings of a Syrian national, who was recognised as a refugee, cannot claim refugee status in terms of international protection for family members, if the beneficiary, although a minor when he was registered as an asylum applicant, was no longer a minor at the time of the court hearing.
UK Court of Appeal rules on the correct test to use when making a decision on cessation of refugee status.
The fact that a person cannot be repatriated under Article 3 of the ECHR does not imply that that person should be granted a leave to reside in the host country by way of subsidiary protection under Directive 2004/83. The person concerned is eligible for subsidiary protection only if there is a real risk of him being intentionally deprived, in his country of origin, of appropriate health care.
In assessing the credibility of a sexual orientation-related claim, personal circumstances have to be taken into account. That a person is not able to elaborate on his awareness and acceptance of his sexual orientation, is not sufficient to conclude that the applicant’s story lacks credibility, when the personal circumstances that explain this inability are considered credible.
The court gave guidance on the application of a structured approach to credibility assessment.
Following the careful examination of International, European and domestic law, the Court concluded that the grant of refugee status supersedes any order made by a Family Court (regarding the return of the child to Pakistan), because it is the Secretary of State for the Home Department that is the entrusted public authority to deal with asylum matters. However, were the Family Court to discover new facts, the relevant public authority would be responsible, in principle, under the tenets of UK Administrative Law to review their decision.
It is not reasonably likely that a draft-evader would face criminal/administrative proceedings in Ukraine but there is a real risk that a person sentenced to imprisonment in Ukraine would be detained on arrival there and that detention conditions would breach Article 3 ECHR.
The right to be heard does not require, as a rule, that, where national legislation provides for two separate procedures for examining applications for refugee status and applications for subsidiary protection, the applicant for subsidiary protection is to have the right to an interview relating to his application and the right to call or cross-examine witnesses when that interview takes place. However, an interview must be arranged where specific circumstances render it necessary in order to examine an application with full knowledge of the facts.
The return of the applicants to Iraq violates Article 3 ECHR as there is a real risk of ill-treatment based on their personal circumstances as a targeted group and the Iraqi authorities’ diminished ability to protect them.