Case summaries

The accusation of a breach of the individual's right to information about the rules and procedures of the refugee status proceedings and about the rights and obligations of the applicant was unfounded, as the application form for refugee status contained this information and was signed by the individual in question to acknowledge that she had been duly informed.

For refugee status to be recognised on grounds of a risk of persecution by non-state actors, it needs to be shown that this risk is linked to persecution grounds listed in the Convention.

'Women subject to domestic violence' do not constitute a social group. The assessment of whether women in Russia constitute a social group within the meaning of the Convention requires an assessment of the actual situation in the country of origin.

Unlike with subsidiary protection, it is necessary for there to be a causal link between persecution and the grounds for persecution when assessing the conditions for granting asylum. The fact that a conflict between LTTE and governmental armed units affected Tamil civilians does not mean nationality qualifies as a ground of persecution. 

The case concerned an accelerated procedure decision. The applicant, an Uzbek national, claimed asylum only after he feared removal from the Czech Republic, his application was therefore rejected as unfounded by the Ministry of the Interior. However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) disagreed and set a three condition test to be applied in order to determine when an application is unfounded. The SAC also pointed out that the grounds for applying for international protection can be based on events which had taken place since the applicant left the country of origin.

It is important to inquire whether there are elements relative to the situation of homosexuals in their country which enable them to be considered as forming a group whose members would face a risk of persecution, for reasons of common characteristics which define them in the eyes of the authorities and society.

The applicant was not granted refugee status or protection against deportation in accordance with Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act. The court found:

1. A single woman with a “Western” lifestyle is not at risk of gender-based political persecution by non-State actors in Iraq.
2. The risk of the applicant becoming a victim of an honour killing (or respectively a weaker, non-life threatening disciplinary measure by her clan) because of her moral conduct, disapproved by her clan, constitutes an increased individual risk. However, this risk is not the result of arbitrary violence, but constitutes a typical general risk.

Internal protection is considered available for women suffering domestic abuse and violence in Albania. 

This case considered whether or not a “family” could constitute a particular social group under the Refugee Convention. The applicant, whose family was implicated in a vendetta, had a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of her membership of the social group that is her family. It was held by the CALL that a family could constitute a particular social group. 

A Lebanese woman was recognised as a refugee after a death threat by her brother because of her way of life. The court found:

1. State protection doesn’t exist against ‘honour killings’ in Lebanon.
2. Women who do not accept discrimination and denial of rights, which are based on tradition and social circumstances in their home country, constitute a particular social group in terms of Art. 10 (2) (d) of the Qualification Directive.
3. Even a single person can be a non-state actor under Section 60 (1) sentence (4) (c) of the Residence Act (identical to Art 6 (c) of the Qualification Directive).

The applicant, a lesbian from Iran, was recognised as a refugee. The court found:

1. It is unreasonable for homosexuals to refrain from sexual activities in order to avoid persecution.

2. Although there is no systematic persecution of homosexuals in Iran, there is a considerable risk of detection and persecution.

The Administrative Court lawfully decided that the applicant was not entitled to refugee status since, in the present case, a possible risk of being subjected to acts of persecution was not connected to the reasons for persecution. The group of "businessmen in Colombia" cannot be regarded as a "particular social group" within the meaning of Art. 10.1 (d) of the Qualification Directive.