Case summaries

Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/83 requires the determining authority, under its duty of cooperation, to obtain up-to-date country of origin information and, where relevant, a medico-legal report on the applicant’s mental health; a breach of that duty does not automatically lead to annulment unless it may have affected the outcome.

Under Directive 2005/85, delays in the asylum procedure cannot be justified by legislative changes and, on their own, do not warrant setting aside a decision absent an impact on the outcome.

Article 4(5)(e) of Directive 2004/83 means that a false statement later explained and withdrawn at the first opportunity does not, by itself, undermine the applicant’s general credibility.

HIV-related marginalisation and discrimination can reach the threshold of seriousness to establish persecution but is not sufficient to be granted international protection. In order to benefit from international protection, it must be established that there are personal reasons for a well-founded fear of being persecuted due to HIV-contamination. In this context, seropositivity can be regarded as being part of a social group, which is a valid persecution ground.  In the case at hand, the Court took into account aspects of vulnerability which are unrelated to HIV-status.

LGBTI asylum seekers (1) may be members of particular social group, (2) cannot be expected to conceal or restrain their expression of sexual orientation to reduce risk of persecution. (3) All criminalisation does not per se amount to persecution, but imprisonment actually applied does.

“If an asylum applicant is shown to be in need, and if it can be expected that an applicant’s fundamental human rights and freedoms would or might be infringed, the administrative authority must give the applicant for asylum or subsidiary protection the benefit of the doubt in relation to the facts stated by the applicant.”

The Applicants' applications for asylum were rejected as they did not tell the truth about their former residence(s) before moving to Belgium, and it could therefore not be ruled out that they were also nationals of or enjoyed protection status in another country. However, they could not be deported to Afghanistan, even though it was at least established that they were Afghan nationals.

If an applicant for international protection has citizenship of one country and a place of last permanent residence in another country, the assessment of persecution or serious harm is considered primarily with regard to the country of nationality. The country of last permanent residence is examined in cases of stateless persons.

The CALL confirmed that the need for protection should be assessed in relation to the country of nationality (or, for stateless persons, vis-à-vis the country of former habitual residence) and that this is not influenced by the fact that the applicant resided in a “safe third country” or in a “first country of asylum,” or has a “real residence alternative,” these concepts having no grounds in Belgian law. The CALL did however add that if the applicant has refugee or subsidiary protection status in another country, he/she has no direct interest in having that status also recognised in Belgium, except if he/she can demonstrate a fear of persecution or a real risk of serious harm in that other country. 

The CALL ruled that it is an applicant’s obligation to give as complete a picture as possible of their profile and past, including the countries and places of previous residence, in order to allow an assessment of the need for subsidiary protection. In the case of a stay/residence of many years outside his/her country of origin, it cannot be ruled out that the applicant has citizenship in a third country and that protection in Belgium is not needed.