Case summaries

Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/83 requires the determining authority, under its duty of cooperation, to obtain up-to-date country of origin information and, where relevant, a medico-legal report on the applicant’s mental health; a breach of that duty does not automatically lead to annulment unless it may have affected the outcome.

Under Directive 2005/85, delays in the asylum procedure cannot be justified by legislative changes and, on their own, do not warrant setting aside a decision absent an impact on the outcome.

Article 4(5)(e) of Directive 2004/83 means that a false statement later explained and withdrawn at the first opportunity does not, by itself, undermine the applicant’s general credibility.

In the context of cessation of refugee status under Article 11 (1)(e), the change in circumstances must remedy the reasons which led to the recognition of refugee status; a country of origin’s ability or inability to demonstrate that it can provide protection from acts of persecution constitutes ‘a crucial element’ in this assessment.

Mere social and financial support to the third country national is inherently incapable of either preventing acts of persecution or of detecting, prosecuting and punishing such acts and, therefore, cannot be regarded as providing the protection required by Article 11(1)(e). In order to determine whether the third-country national still has a well-founded fear of persecution, the existence of protection against acts of persecution should be considered when examining the change in circumstances.

UK Court of Appeal rules on the correct test to use when making a decision on cessation of refugee status.

The court gave guidance on the application of a structured approach to credibility assessment.

The Spanish Supreme Court’s Administrative Chamber decides on the appeal of an asylum applicant, whose application has been rejected.  The applicant states that upon return to his home country (Ivory Coast) he will suffer a risk of persecution.

However, both the National Court and the Supreme Court ruled that no risk of persecution exists in this case, because there is no enough evidence to conclude on that risk.

The Court suspended domestic proceedings and referred the case for preliminary ruling procedure to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The Court asked the CJEU to clarify the substance of its ban on exposing applicants for international protection to ‘tests’ to substantiate their sexual orientation.

The decision of denying asylum is disproportionate, as the fact that the acts of persecution are indiscriminate and affect a large majority of the population do not exclude the application of the 1951 Convention when the necessary elements of the provision are present. The reports of UNHCR were also noted in the Court’s assessment, particularly regarding the risk groups that the organisation has characterised.

There is a real risk that by virtue of his predicted employment in the media sector the Appellant will be persecuted for political opinion and/or that a breach of his rights under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR will occur.

The Appellant is not to be denied refugee status on the ground that it would be open to him to seek to engage in employment other than in the journalistic or media sector.

The case is a referral back to the CNDA from the Council of State in no. 350661 where the Council had found the CNDA to have erred in law in a previous appeal  (no. 10012810) by finding that Nigerian women, who were victims of human trafficking networks and who had actively sought to escape the network, constituted a social group within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The CNDA found that victims of trafficking from the Edo State do, indeed, share a common background and distinct identity which falls within the definition of a particular social group. The applicant was given refugee status.

When assessing an asylum application, a judge shall consider as relevant both the applicant’s homosexuality as well as the fact that homosexuality is considered a crime in the country of origin of the applicant. Moreover, the judge shall base its reasoning not only on the assessment of credibility of the applicant, but also on the actual situation in the country of origin, which has to be verified through its own power of investigation.