Case summaries
It is in principle possible for men to be persecuted on account of their gender. However, classifying the punishment for extramarital sex in Afghanistan as persecution on account of both membership of the group of men and the group of women would cover the entire society and renders the definition meaningless. Therefore, the applicant was not granted refugee status but his deportation was prohibited under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act / Art 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive.
A stateless Kurd from Syria was not recognised as a refugee. The court held:
- The denial of re-entry of stateless Kurds is not to be considered political persecution because a general institutional practice cannot be detected which is aimed against ethnic Kurds in a manner that is relevant to asylum grounds (Art 10 of the Qualification Directive).
- Whether the legal practice of Syrian legislation on citizenship and the denial of re-entry are part of a restrictive policy towards Kurds, and support the aims of the State of Syria in respect of its settlement policy, is not important when determining political persecution under Section 60 (1) sentence (5) of the Residence Act in connection with Art. 9 and 10 Qualification Directive.
The CALL confirmed that the need for protection should be assessed in relation to the country of nationality (or, for stateless persons, vis-à-vis the country of former habitual residence) and that this is not influenced by the fact that the applicant resided in a “safe third country” or in a “first country of asylum,” or has a “real residence alternative,” these concepts having no grounds in Belgian law. The CALL did however add that if the applicant has refugee or subsidiary protection status in another country, he/she has no direct interest in having that status also recognised in Belgium, except if he/she can demonstrate a fear of persecution or a real risk of serious harm in that other country.
In applying Art 12 of the Qualification Directive concerning exclusion from refugee status, the decision-maker is required to conduct an individual assessment of the applicant’s circumstances and, specifically, of his own complicity, if any, in crimes against humanity.
Women who are subjected to the norms and customary laws of FGM and forced marriage in rural areas in Nigeria cannot avail themselves of the protection of the State authorities, and their attitude is perceived as an infringement by the community members. They therefore form a social group within the meaning of Article 1 A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Furthermore, the impossibility of marrying another person constitutes an obstacle to leading a normal life in another part of the country and an alternative protection alternative cannot be considered.
The situation which prevails today in some geographical areas of Somalia, in particular in and around Mogadishu, must be seen as a situation of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict, in the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].
Rights violations resulting from a forced marriage, including the use of physical and mental violence, constitute severe violations of basic human rights in terms of Art 9.1 (a) of the Qualification Directive.
The Iranian state is neither able nor willing to protect women against persecution by relatives in case of forced marriage.
Application of the CJEU ‘s ruling of the 2 March 2010, Abdulla et al. Case C 175/08 et al, following the request for a preliminary ruling by the Federal Administrative Court.
The High Administrative Court was correct in holding that the circumstances upon which the recognition of refugee status was based have ceased to exist. However, it did not examine sufficiently whether a well-founded fear of persecution persists for other reasons.
The Court must inquire into the circumstances which establish a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment fulfilling the requirements of subsidiary protection.
The applicant was granted a residence permit on the grounds of subsidiary protection. Based on up-to-date accounts of the security situation in central Iraq he was found to be at risk of suffering serious harm from indiscriminate violence in Baghdad, his region of origin, in accordance with Section 88(1)(3) of the Aliens’ Act. The ruling of the CJEU in Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie (C-465/07) was taken into consideration in the case.