Case summaries
The case is a referral back to the CNDA from the Council of State in no. 350661 where the Council had found the CNDA to have erred in law in a previous appeal (no. 10012810) by finding that Nigerian women, who were victims of human trafficking networks and who had actively sought to escape the network, constituted a social group within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The CNDA found that victims of trafficking from the Edo State do, indeed, share a common background and distinct identity which falls within the definition of a particular social group. The applicant was given refugee status.
LGBTI asylum seekers (1) may be members of particular social group, (2) cannot be expected to conceal or restrain their expression of sexual orientation to reduce risk of persecution. (3) All criminalisation does not per se amount to persecution, but imprisonment actually applied does.
The Applicant, an unaccompanied Afghan minor, stated that he had left his home country owing to his abduction and the threat of sexual abuse by the local ruler. The right to a decision by the statutory judge was violated by the fact that the decision on the application for international protection was made by a court panel consisting of two judges, one male and one female.
Conclusions on exclusion from protection are to be supported by factual findings and cannot be presumed, especially with an applicant, who through the credibility assessment, is deemed to be untrustworthy by an administrative body. Belonging to the army under Saddam Hussein might, together with the Sunni religion of the applicant, be understood as a reason for well-founded fear of persecution because of membership of a particular social group.
Tibetans in China are not at risk of “group persecution” based on their ethnicity. However, individual acts of persecution (the rape of a Tibetan woman by security forces in the present case) do constitute past persecution since they have to be regarded as being connected to the persecution ground “race”.
The Court held that the question of whether discrimination, taken cumulatively, amounts to persecution in a given case is a matter for the Refugee Appeals Tribunal.
It is in principle possible for men to be persecuted on account of their gender. However, classifying the punishment for extramarital sex in Afghanistan as persecution on account of both membership of the group of men and the group of women would cover the entire society and renders the definition meaningless. Therefore, the applicant was not granted refugee status but his deportation was prohibited under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act / Art 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive.
Refugee status was granted as the applicant was deemed at risk of persecution due to his homosexuality. The court found that homosexuals constitute a particular social group in Cameroon according to Section 60 (1) of the Residence Act / Art 10.1 (d) of the Qualification Directive. According to the Qualification Directive, sexual orientation does not only constitute an unchangeable characteristic, but is so fundamental to the identity of a person that he/she should not be forced to denounce it. That means that under the Qualification Directive it is no longer important if the applicant can persevere with abstinence in the long term. The punishment which the applicant would face due to homosexual acts in case of return does not simply constitute criminal prosecution, but is persecution in terms of Section 60 (1) Residence Act.
This concerned a claim of persecution as conscientious objector and the use of previous decisions. The first applicant claimed that he faced persecution in Israel because he was a conscientious objector. The Appeals Tribunal Member found that he was only a ‘partial’ objector and referred to a previous decision of his own in which he had entered into a detailed analysis the situation for conscientious objectors in Israel. This previous decision was not made available to the applicants or the legal issues raised were not flagged with the applicants’ legal advisors. The Court found that this previous decision was of such substance, importance and materiality that it ought to have been put to the legal representatives of the applicants for comment before the appeals were determined.