Case summaries

It is not reasonably likely that a draft-evader would face criminal/administrative proceedings in Ukraine but there is a real risk that a person sentenced to imprisonment in Ukraine would be detained on arrival there and that detention conditions would breach Article 3 ECHR.

The applicant challenged the Belgian Minister of Asylum and Migration’s decision not to grant him a humanitarian visa via an emergency application before the CALL. He relied on the following grounds: inter alia, (i) his medical condition and (ii) the poor living conditions of the West Bank in Palestine.

The CALL decided (i) these two elements justified an urgent decision, (ii) there was a risk of serious prejudice which would be difficult to remedy if the Minister’s decision was enforced, and (iii) there were serious grounds for invalidating the Minister’s decision since denying a visa to the applicant was likely to constitute a breach of art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), thus fulfilling the three conditions under art. 39/82 of the Belgian Aliens Law 15-12-1980. 

In the case of an individual benefiting from subsidiary protection according to the Qualification Directive, the non-fulfilment of the passport obligation cannot be taken into account in the exercising of discretion for the assessment of authorisation for access to employment.

The Helsinki Administrative Court took the view that a residence permit had to be granted to an Afghan asylum seeker on the grounds of subsidiary protection due a threat of vendetta based on a land dispute.

This was a decision of the Polish Refugee Board of 29 August 2013 to uphold that part of the decision of the Head of the Polish Office for Foreigners which concerned refusal to accord refugee status and to overturn the remainder of the decision as well as to grant subsidiary protection.

The results of the linguistic analysis carried out by an external expert company should be assessed in the context of all the evidence gathered in the case, taking into account the principle of the benefit of doubt, also as regards establishing the country of origin.

Certain inaccuracies in the detail actually lend credibility to the testimony. This is evident particularly if one takes into account the fact that the foreign woman is a simple person without any education.

Instead of non-refoulement, the Court granted the Applicant subsidiary protection status because he would be at risk of serious harm upon returning to his home country (torture, cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment).

Rather than dismissing the application, the Court recognised the subsidiary protection status of the Applicant, as his/her return to the country of origin would lead to the risk of serious harm (inhuman, degrading treatment or indiscriminate violence).

In the case of individuals who are eligible for subsidiary protection according to the Qualification Directive, the limitation of residence represents an unauthorised limitation on the free movement of persons according to Article 32 of the Qualification Directive if it is based solely on social welfare grounds.  

The Court granted permission to the Applicants to seek judicial review of the negative decision made in a written appeal (rather than an oral appeal) in an application for refugee status made by a South African one-parent family. The decision to allow a written appeal was based on the status of South Africa as a ‘safe country,’ and the appeal decision was based on personal credibility and the absence of a nexus to Convention grounds. The Applicants failed in their argument that the absence of an oral hearing may render the appeal decision unlawful by reference to the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by the Asylum Procedures Directive, because the Applicants had in fact availed of the appeal rather than challenge the fact that it was confined to a written appeal. Leave to seek judicial review was granted on the basis that an aspect of the claim which was disclosed after the first instance decision was not properly considered; that the decision maker made exaggerated credibility findings to the potential detriment of a subsequent subsidiary protection application; and erred in the consideration of country of origin information and evidence of the availability of internal protection.

This case concerns whether there is an armed conflict in Iraq which meets the threshold of indiscriminate violence set out in Article 15(c) Qualification Directive, such that all applicants from Iraq require subsidiary protection.