Case summaries
This case concerned the risk of violation of Article 3 for the proposed deportation to Iraq of a single female who was a member of the Mandaean religious minority.
In its previous judgment the Court had found that there would be no violation, provided that the applicant was returned to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
The case was struck out unanimously by the Grand Chamber pursuant to Article 37 § 1 ECHR given that the applicant had been granted a permanent residence permit in Sweden.
An asylum seeker, submitting his claim to a non-competent authority is considered to be staying illegally in the territory of Greece and falls within the scope of the provisions on detention of Directive 2008/115/EC and Law 3907/2011 for returning illegally staying third-country nationals for as long as his identity remains unconfirmed. The deadline for the referral of his application to the competent authorities begins when the applicant provides assistance, as dictated by his duty to cooperate, with regards to the verification of his identity.
This is the subsequent Supreme Court ruling following the preliminary reference ruling by the CJEU in C-604/12 in relation to the examination of subsidiary protection within the asylum procedure in Ireland. The case also addresses the legality in EU law of the two stage procedure in Ireland and the lack of a single asylum procedure.
The case is a referral back to the CNDA from the Council of State in no. 350661 where the Council had found the CNDA to have erred in law in a previous appeal (no. 10012810) by finding that Nigerian women, who were victims of human trafficking networks and who had actively sought to escape the network, constituted a social group within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The CNDA found that victims of trafficking from the Edo State do, indeed, share a common background and distinct identity which falls within the definition of a particular social group. The applicant was given refugee status.
When assessing an asylum application, a judge shall consider as relevant both the applicant’s homosexuality as well as the fact that homosexuality is considered a crime in the country of origin of the applicant. Moreover, the judge shall base its reasoning not only on the assessment of credibility of the applicant, but also on the actual situation in the country of origin, which has to be verified through its own power of investigation.
The judgment concerns the status of military deserters under the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) and the definition to be accorded to persecutory acts following on from a refusal to perform military service. Whilst the definition of military service is to include support staff the CJEU has held that there must be a sufficient link between the asylum seeker’s actions and the preparation or eventual commission of war crimes.
The individual must establish with sufficient plausibility that his unit is highly likely to commit war crimes and that there exists a body of evidence capable of credibly establishing that the specific military service will commit war crimes. Moreover, desertion is the only way to avoid participation in war crimes and disproportionate and discriminatory acts should be assessed in light of a State’s domestic prerogatives.
The Supreme Court held that the National High Court of Spain (Audiencia Nacional) erred in annulling the General Deputy Director of Asylum’s decision to reject the Appellant’s request for international protection because the National High Court of Spain failed to consider the substance of the Appellant’s request for asylum.
The Supreme Court declared that the National High Court erred when annulling the decision of the General Sub-Directorate for Asylum (Ministry of Interior) to reject the Appellant’s request for international protection. The National High Court annulled the decision but did not consider the Appellant’s core claim: the request for international protection.
As the National High Court was in possession of all necessary facts required to decide on the substance of the request by the Appellant for international protection, it should have been able to determine as such. As a result, the Supreme Court upheld the appeal.
Even after the introduction of Art. 3 (3) AsylG, the previous legal practice with regard to persons who justify their asylum application by refusing military service or desertion in their home country continues to be valid. Accordingly, a conscientious objection to military service or desertion cannot establish refugee status on its own, only if it is associated with persecution within the meaning of Art. 3 para. 1 AsylG.
The case concerns an appeal of an Algerian woman to the Council of State, against a decision taken on the 17 June 2013 by the National Court of Asylum (CNDA), who rejected the appeal against the Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Person’s (OFPRA) decision concerning the applicant’s application for asylum.
The Council of State annulled the decision of the CNDA, stating that before finding the existence of a reasonable possibility for the applicant to find internal protection in another region of her country of origin, the Court should have looked into which part of the Algerian territory the applicant could, in all safety, access, settle, exist and lead a normal family life without the fear of being persecuted or being exposed to the risk of serious violence from her ex-husband.