Case summaries
The Supreme Court held, in light of a UNHCR Report concerning Colombian asylum seekers, that the burden of proof had been reversed; the High National Court had to establish that the Colombian authorities could effectively protect the applicant from the agents of persecution.
This case concerned fear of persecution for reasons of race and membership of a particular social group. The provisions of Article 1(4) of Presidential Decree 61/1999, which should be interpreted with reference to Articles 3 and 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, recognize the special circumstances of asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors, for whom special procedural guarantees have been established. When examining asylum applications submitted by unaccompanied minors one must consider the Applicants' maturity and level of mental development; take into account the fact that they may have a limited knowledge of the prevailing situation in their country; and also bear in mind that their ways of expressing their fears may differ from those of adults. Particular emphasis is given to the existence of objective factors, based on which one can assess the existence of a well-founded fear that unaccompanied minors may be persecuted in their own country. The contested decision is annulled for insufficient reasoning because there is no evidence in the file that the Administration took care to ensure that a special temporary representative was appointed for the unaccompanied minor, and there is no reference in the report to there having been an oral assessment to determine the level of his mental maturity.
The case concerned an accelerated procedure decision. The applicant, an Uzbek national, claimed asylum only after he feared removal from the Czech Republic, his application was therefore rejected as unfounded by the Ministry of the Interior. However, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) disagreed and set a three condition test to be applied in order to determine when an application is unfounded. The SAC also pointed out that the grounds for applying for international protection can be based on events which had taken place since the applicant left the country of origin.
If a subsequent application is based on “post-flight reasons” created by the applicant, he has to provide good reasons why he has become politically active or has intensified his activities.
As a rule, “post-flight reasons” which have been created by the applicant following the termination of an asylum procedure are not relevant for granting refugee status. An exception to this rule may be given if the activities which the applicant engaged in since he left the country of origin constitute a continuation of convictions which have been practiced before. However, activities which fulfil these criteria are not by themselves sufficient to constitute an exception to the rule. In addition the applicant has to provide good reasons to explain why he has become politically active or has intensified his activities after an unsuccessful earlier asylum application.
The applicant, being in a religiously mixed marriage, can be considered as a person having a justified fear of being persecuted for religious reasons. In accordance with the Qualification Directive, the deciding authority is obliged to gather sufficient information on the accessibility and effectiveness of protection provided by state authorities in the country of origin.
The principle of family unity, which is a general principle of refugee law resulting in particular from the 1951 Refugee Convention, is not applicable to persons falling within the scheme of subsidiary protection, as defined both by the Qualification Directive and by the internal legislative provisions which transpose it.
It is important to inquire whether there are elements relative to the situation of homosexuals in their country which enable them to be considered as forming a group whose members would face a risk of persecution, for reasons of common characteristics which define them in the eyes of the authorities and society.
The applicant’s refugee status was revoked due to a change in circumstances in the applicant’s country of origin as per section 107 subsection 5 of the Aliens’ Act, where the applicant’s individual need of protection was assessed in light of the notable and established social change in Sudan.
The situation in Paktia province in Afghanistan meets the requirements of an internal armed conflict in terms of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act / Art 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive. An internal armed conflict does not necessarily have to affect the whole of the country of origin. The concept of internal protection does not apply if the applicant cannot reasonably be expected to reside in another part of the country because of an illness, even if that illness is not life-threatening (epilepsy in the case at hand).
The applicant was not granted refugee status or protection against deportation in accordance with Section 60 (2) through (7) of the Residence Act. The court found:
- A single woman with a “Western” lifestyle is not at risk of gender-based political persecution by non-State actors in Iraq.
- The risk of the applicant becoming a victim of an honour killing (or respectively a weaker, non-life threatening disciplinary measure by her clan) because of her moral conduct, disapproved by her clan, constitutes an increased individual risk. However, this risk is not the result of arbitrary violence, but constitutes a typical general risk.