Case summaries
Establishing that an asylum seeker is unconvincing is a matter of assessing the evidence, which can only take place when reaching a decision. The competent authority for international protection is not obliged to notify the Applicant in advance regarding its assessment of the evidence.
Paragraph 9 of Article 23 of the International Protection Act stipulates that when assessing an application for international protection the Ministry of the Interior (MI) needs to take into account the specific information on the country of origin that is connected exclusively to the matter at hand. This can also include the manner of enforcing laws and other regulations in the country of origin. The fact that the Applicant participated in the protests is indisputable, thus the MI should have obtained specific information on whether Iranian legislation defines participation in protests and getting involved in a confrontation with security forces as an act that could lead to persecution.
Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order.
This case concerned special protection status in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention andexclusion from protection of those who have committed a serious crime under “common law”. The crime committed by the applicant (attempted murder of the Indian Ambassador in Romania) does not fall within the concepts of “political”, “composite” or “related” crimes, even if it was carried out because of the offender's political opinions or principles, or with the intent of achieving such aims. The implementation of the exclusion clause is not precluded because of the fact that the party has already served the sentence which was imposed. The judgment regarding the applicant having committed a serious criminal offence was justified. The decision was opposed by a minority. Consideration was given to the severity of the persecution the applicant risked suffering should he return to India and non-refoulement was approved, his deportation was given suspensive effect, and he was given temporary leave to remain on humanitarian grounds.
The Afghan applicant was granted subsidiary protection status during the court proceedings. The authority must make sure that the applicant is not at risk of serious harm or persecution in the relevant part of the country, not only at the time the application is assessed but also that this is not likely to occur in the future either. Countries struggling with armed conflicts do not normally provide safe internal flight options within the country, as the movement of front lines can put areas at risk that were previously considered safe.
The Applicants' applications for asylum were rejected as they did not tell the truth about their former residence(s) before moving to Belgium, and it could therefore not be ruled out that they were also nationals of or enjoyed protection status in another country. However, they could not be deported to Afghanistan, even though it was at least established that they were Afghan nationals.
The exclusion of a person who had belonged to a terrorist organisation depended on a personal examination to see whether there were genuine grounds to attribute to him a personal responsibility as organiser, author or accomplice to serious crimes under ordinary law or actions contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
According to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia the general credibility of the Applicant is an internationally recognised standard that takes into account numerous conditions when assessing the Applicant’s level of credibility, who does not have any material evidence to prove his persecution. However, the Applicant’s general credibility will provide the necessary trust in his statement as regards his persecution for the state to grant him international protection even without any material or other evidence, merely on the basis of his statements.
The Appellant should have demanded for an expert to be appointed already during the administrative procedure, at the very latest during the appeal. According to the Supreme Court the objection that a psychiatric expert was not appointed represents an impermissible appeal novelty. The Supreme Court also added that the psychological health of the parties in court procedures is assumed as a fact.
The High Court held that the Minister is entitled in a subsidiary protection application to rely on the findings made during the refugee status determination process unless these findings are legally wrong or the reasoning is defective. The Applicant cannot “collaterally attack” the findings of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) (which have not otherwise been challenged) through a judicial review of the subsidiary protection decision. The lapse of time amounting to almost one year between the oral hearing by the RAT and the issuing of its decision, could not be challenged in the context of seeking to review the subsequent subsidiary protection decision, and the reliance by the Minister on the RAT’s use of an expert medical report was permissible.
This case concerns the State’s obligation to attempt to trace the family members of unaccompanied minor asylum seekers.
The authorities of first and second instance—the Head of the Office for Foreigners and the Polish Council for Refugees—refused to grant refugee status or other forms of protection to an applicant from Uganda who had applied for refugee status because of his sexual orientation. They made the same decisions but on fundamentally different grounds and factual findings. The first instance authority found that the applicant was homosexual but that the information about the country of origin indicated that his fear was not well-founded. The second instance authority found that homosexuals are at risk of persecution in Uganda but that the applicant was not homosexual, and the opinion of a doctor who is a sexologist did not prove sexual orientation. Instead, this needed to be proved based on the testimony of the applicant, which is then verified in the context of his general credibility during the proceedings.
A Russian Federation citizen arrived in Finland from another EU country (Lithuania) where he/she alleged that he/she had been persecuted and claimed international protection on this basis. The Immigration Service denied the Applicant a residence permit, failed to examine the application for international protection and decided to deport him/her to Lithuania. The Immigration Service considered Lithuania to be a safe third country and the application for international protection was not examined in relation to his/her country of origin. The Supreme Administrative Court took the view that the issue of international protection could not be dealt with in Lithuania as the grounds for the application were cited as persecution in that same country. The Administrative Court was ordered to overturn the Immigration Service’s decision and return the case back for further consideration.