Case summaries

This case concerned exclusion from refugee status on the basis of a war crime and a serious non-political crime.

A Chechen who was involved in the Second Chechen War - outside of the general combat action - in the killing and wounding of Russian soldiers and the kidnapping of a Russian officer to force the release of another Chechen is at risk of being exposed to torture or at least inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Russian Federation. 

This case concerned a real well-founded fear of persecution (re-enslavement of the Applicant), failure to recognise the Applicant's refugee status as a member “of a particular social group” and a finding that his fear was not due to the grounds for persecution as defined by Article 1A of the Convention.

It was held that, should he return to his country, there was a risk that the Applicant would suffer serious harm (inhuman and degrading treatment because of potential re-enslavement) which justified granting him subsidiary protection under Article 15(2)(b) of the Directive.

Furthermore, and irrespective of the above, the Committee felt that it would amount to inhuman and degrading treatment under the said Article if the Applicant (who was suffering from chronic renal failure and hypertension) were deprived of the appropriate medical care and treatment for his condition, believing that should he return he would possibly not have access to the health care system (which was, in any case, deemed ineffective) in his country of origin, and this would be tantamount to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.

The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the appellant against the High National Court’s decision to reject the appellant’s administrative appeal against the denial of his application for refugee status. 

The appellant is a Columbian national and claims to fear political persecution if he is returned to his country because of threats from the FARC group (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) due to the appellant’s refusal to permit two of his sons to join the armed group.

 The Supreme Court rejects the appeal, affirming the High National Court’s decision to deny asylum.Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejects the appeal for protection on the grounds of humanitarian considerations as contained in Spanish Law.   

It is expected and necessary that persons fearing persecution should fully and continuously cooperate with the authorities handling their case.

Since the life, basic safety and livelihood chances of people are involved, based on the above described amount and nature of danger (in such cases naturally the actual danger need not and cannot be undoubtedly proved) the very likely occurrence of persecution, harm or other significant detriment cannot be risked.

In relation to the internal protection alternative, the Applicant must have family or kinship ties, or his/her basic livelihood and accommodation must be provided by other means in a certain part of the country.

This case concerned the conditions under which a refusal to perform military service for conscientious reasons may justify granting refugee status. The Minister for Public Order did not give reasons for deviating from the competent Committee's recommendation, nor did he find it to be ambiguous or to have any other legal defect, while he could have referred the case back to that body for reassessment. The application for annulment is granted.

Instead of rejecting the application, the Court granted subsidiary protection status to the single female Applicant and her minor children, as their return to the country of origin would lead to the risk of serious harm (indiscriminate violence).

B.G., a citizen of the Russian Federation, applied for refugee status, citing persecution experienced due to his brother being in prison. The authorities of both instances questioned his credibility, citing numerous inconsistencies in the various testimonies given. The foreignor then appealed to the Regional Administrative Court, which dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the proceedings had been conducted properly and referring to the fact that the foreignor was able to flee internally in his country of origin.

The authority conducting the proceedings provides, where necessary, translations into Polish of documents in a foreign language that are admissible as evidence in refugee status proceedings.

The option of internal flight means that if there is a part of the country of origin where there are no circumstances justifying the foreignor's fear of persecution or serious harm and it can reasonably be presumed that the foreignor will be able to move there without impediment, there is no well-founded fear of persecution or actual risk of serious harm in the country of origin. If the conditions in one region do not suit the foreignor, he can try to move to another part of the country.

The age of the child and the mental state of the Applicant as well as the ban on more detailed questioning on the reasons for fleeing in the initial police interview should have been taken into account to a greater extent when assessing the assertion of flight. The lack of discussion of these aspects represents a failure to investigate several decisive points, which made the decision by the Asylum Court arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional

The shifting of the burden of proof according to Article 4 (4) of the Qualification Directive applies if the Applicant refers to previous acts of persecution or threats as an indicator of the well-foundedness of his fear that persecution would resume if he were to return to his home country.

If it is assumed that the individual concerned was under immediate threat of persecution associated with his ethnicity when he left his home country, then the link is not simply with the ethnicity of the individual concerned (Chechen in this case), but also with the enmity generally expressed by the persecuting security forces against this ethnic group and their presumed political convictions.

The Applicant was a homosexual male from Iran who had renounced Islam and was studying the catechism of the Roman Catholic doctrine. It was held that the Applicant had no well-founded (objective) fear of persecution on the grounds of changing his religious beliefs.

Regarding the risks associated with his sexual orientation, the fear that the Applicant expressed was deemed to be well-founded, and it was held that not externalising his sexual orientation to avoid danger would, in and of itself, constitute serious harm to his right to respect for his private life and his right to not be discriminated against. Therefore, his refugee status was recognised and he was granted the international protection in the form of refugee status.