Case summaries
In light of the provisions of Article 5 Dublin III Regulation, which serve to protect the asylum seeker in a Dublin transfer, the individual subject to a Dublin transfer decision must be seen to have a subjective right to a personal interview. Before such an interview, which must take into account the subjective perspective of the individual, has been conducted in a manner which meets the criteria of Article 5 of Dublin III, the authorities cannot conclude that no obstructions to the removal are present.
The court found that the removal of a Somali applicant to Italy under the Dublin Regulation would not result in a violation of article 3of the Convention and would not entail any violation of the rights set in article 1, 2, 5, 6 and 13.
Where negative reports regarding the reception conditions and inhuman or degrading treatment in a first country of asylum indicate that an Applicant may not be safe in such a country, an Applicant’s request to remain in a Member State pending a decision on their right to remain must be given the benefit of doubt and outweigh the public’s interest in immediate enforcement of the ordered transfer.
An Applicant who has been convicted of a serious crime is excluded from the right to claim protection. A life sentence with an undeterminable term does not constitute a temporary obstruction to deportation and therefore an Applicant cannot claim obstruction as grounds for leave to remain. Further, a family connection which has been examined by a criminal court as part of a final judgment cannot be re-examined as part of an asylum application.
In Dublin Transfer matters handled by the Migration Board, an Applicant may have the right to Legal Aid even though this right is not specifically provided in the Dublin III Regulation. In such cases, the right to Legal Aid will be provided pursuant to the Swedish Aliens Act and will depend on factors such as indications that a transfer should not occur due to circumstances in the receiving Member State or other reasons which would make it inappropriate to execute the transfer.
The CJEU ruling concerned the scope of protection available under EU law to third country nationals suffering from serious illness whose removal would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. The CJEU surmisedthat the removal of a person suffering a serious illness to a country where appropriate treatment was not available could in exceptional circumstances be contrary to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in such circumstances their removal had to be suspended pursuant to Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. The Directive 2008/115/EC required the provision of emergency health care and essential treatment of illness to be made available to such persons during the period in which the Member State is required to postpone their removal.
The CJEU ruling concerned the scope of protection available under EU law to third country nationals suffering from serious illness whose removal would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. The CJEU ruled that, although the removal of a seriously ill person could in exceptional circumstances amount to a breach of Article 3 ECHR, the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) is to be interpreted as not requiring a Member State to grant the social welfare and health care benefits to a third country national who has been granted leave to reside in the territory of that Member State under national legislation.
A Palestinian who leaves Syria due to the unstable security situation as a result of the Syrian conflict must be regarded as having been forced to leave UNRWA’s area of operations and may thus qualify as a refugee without being required to show fear of persecution.
The appellant sought to have the decision of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Public Order annulled, under which her previous application for her and her son to be recognised as refugees had been rejected. The Hellenic Council of State rejected the current appeal, due to the fact that the appellant had invoked financial reasons for leaving Syria and as such, had no legal basis to be recognised as a refugee.
The UK Court of Appeal held that the Secretary of State’s practice of detaining people under the Detained Fast Track (DFT) system while they await an appeal for a refusal of an application for asylum is unlawful. Although permitted by a policy document, an avenue for appeal within the DFT and its procedures were neither clear nor transparent, and there was no possible justification for detaining people while awaiting an appeal.