Case summaries
NB: the case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which issued a new ruling on 13 February 2020. For the EDAL summary of the final judgment, see here.
The continued and exclusive control of contracting State's authorities over individuals creates, at least, a de facto exercise of jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR.
An asylum seeker was prohibited to travel from Ceuta (Spanish autonomous territory) to the Spanish peninsula despite the fact his application for international protection was being examined.
Transit through a third country cannot be considered a sufficient connection for the purposes of the “safe third country” concept on the sole reason that the country is located in proximity to the country of origin. Other conditions, such as the length of stay or the existence of a supporting network, need to be present for such a connection to exist.
An applicant may not be detained with a view to carrying out a transfer under the Dublin Regulation, in the absence of objective criteria for assessing the existence of a significant risk of absconding, defined in a binding legal provision of general application.
The words "2, 4 and" and the sentence "This shall also apply in the cases of Section 3 para. 2 no. 1, if the decision is connected with the adoption of a measure terminating the stay". in Section 16 para. 1 BFA-Procedural Act (Bundesamt für Fremdenwesen und Asyl Verfahrensgesetz-BFA-VG), violates Article 136 para. 2 B-VG. The provision was repealed by the Constitutional Court as unconstitutional.
The ECtHR declared inadmissible the complaints brought by a Senegalese national who had unsuccessfully applied for asylum in Spain due to his fear of being persecuted in his country of origin on the grounds of his sexual orientation. The complaints were considered premature since the Audiencia Nacional had annulled the administrative decision rejecting his asylum application and the asylum procedure had started afresh.
The Immigration and Asylum Office unlawfully rejected the claimant’s application for international protection. The court found that the authorities did not objectively assess the evidence and country information provided by the claimant, a Coptic Christian from Egypt. They also failed to correctly interpret the definition of a refugee in accordance with international law and disregarded the special status of the claimant who was an underage applicant.
The benefit of the doubt benefits the minor.
Family unity and the best interests of the child are high priorities when applying the Dublin III Regulation. A child who has applied for international protection in Germany but has members of his family in Greece is entitled to family unity with them in Germany. The Dublin III Regulation specifies that this transfer should be carried out within six months of a Member State’s acceptance of the take charge or take back request. The time period to transfer starts from the Member State’s acceptance of the request. The right of the asylum seeker to be transferred within said time-limit is a subjective right. Whilst Germany had accepted the take charge request they had only planned to transfer the applicants at a time after the six month deadline. An interim injunction was therefore necessary in order to ensure that the rights of the applicant were respected.