Case summaries

This was an appeal against the decision to transfer an applicant to Hungary, when that applicant had first entered the EU through Greece. The argument that Greece’s formal responsibility for the applicant was “interrupted” by the applicant leaving the EU for a short term is contrary to Art 16(3) Dublin Regulation and must be dealt with by initiating procedures for a preliminary ruling at the CJEU. A preliminary ruling should also address the systemic failure of the asylum system in Greece, the risk of a violation of Art 3 ECHR and whether this results in a different Member State being responsible for the asylum procedure.

An asylum application within the meaning of the Asylum Procedures Directive, Article 2, introductory paragraph and Article 2(b), has been made if a foreigner notifies the authorities that he would like to apply for asylum. The provision of the Foreigners Act under which a foreigner who has been declared undesirable has no right to remain is in breach of Article 7 of the Asylum Procedures Directive.

The shifting of the burden of proof according to Article 4 (4) of the Qualification Directive applies if the Applicant refers to previous acts of persecution or threats as an indicator of the well-foundedness of his fear that persecution would resume if he were to return to his home country.

If it is assumed that the individual concerned was under immediate threat of persecution associated with his ethnicity when he left his home country, then the link is not simply with the ethnicity of the individual concerned (Chechen in this case), but also with the enmity generally expressed by the persecuting security forces against this ethnic group and their presumed political convictions.

This case concerned the assessment and reason given that the Applicant had not been subjected to “serious harm” in the past, in circumstances where the decision was unclear as to whether the finding was to the effect that his account was not believed, or whether, if believed, the harm was not inflicted by persons who were "actors of serious harm". The Court also considered the definition of “actors of serious harm.” Thirdly, the Court considered whether the decision-maker ignored the specific claim made in the application that returned asylum seekers face a risk of detention, interrogation and torture such as would amount to "serious harm".

The Applicant was a homosexual male from Iran who had renounced Islam and was studying the catechism of the Roman Catholic doctrine. It was held that the Applicant had no well-founded (objective) fear of persecution on the grounds of changing his religious beliefs.

Regarding the risks associated with his sexual orientation, the fear that the Applicant expressed was deemed to be well-founded, and it was held that not externalising his sexual orientation to avoid danger would, in and of itself, constitute serious harm to his right to respect for his private life and his right to not be discriminated against. Therefore, his refugee status was recognised and he was granted the international protection in the form of refugee status.

This case involved recognition of refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on grounds of religious beliefs.

More specifically, it was held that the arrest and torture the Applicant suffered at the hands of his father and the State authorities because of his Christian faith, the risk of being executed for apostasy because he was baptised in Greece, and the risk of being arrested and maltreated again should he return to Iran, constituted persecution under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the actor of persecution being the State. Furthermore, being forced to conceal one's religious beliefs and/or proclaim belief in another religionin order to avoid persecution and/or deprivation of basic rights constitutes a breach of religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR and also the related case law of the ECtHR.

Despite his family ties, the Applicant was denied an extension to his residence document as he was regarded as a threat to public order and security.

The question was what emphasis had to be placed on the Union membership of the Applicant’s spouse and child of whom they had joint custody.

The expulsion of an asylum seeker after asylum proceedings lasting approximately eight years without any culpable delay by the Applicant, during which he established a family and also integrated well in other respects, infringes his right to a private and family life.

The application by the Applicant for the assignment of a legal adviser for the appeal proceedings was rejected by the Asylum Court because it was late, as the Applicant had only submitted the application after the expiry of the one-month transition period. The Constitutional Court annulled the corresponding transitional regulation on grounds of unconstitutionality: a deadline of only one month was too short to deal with the lack of understanding of asylum seekers of the language and law.

An exclusion order was issued to the Applicant and therefore a measure within the meaning of the Returns Directive. Without undertaking an oral hearing, the appeals authority confirmed the issue of the exclusion order, but reduced its duration. In accordance with Art 47 Para. 2 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the appeals authority was however obliged to undertake an oral hearing.