Case summaries

The Applicants applied for asylum in Sweden, stating that they had arrived from Syria. However, investigations showed that the Applicants had entered Hungary via Serbia and applied for asylum in Hungary prior to arriving to Sweden. The Migration Court of Appeal found that the Hungarian asylum procedure and reception conditions did not contain such substantial deficiencies, that it was impossible to transfer the Applicants to Hungary in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation. However, two of the Applicants were small children, and had the Applicants been transferred to Hungary there was an imminent risk of lengthy waiting periods and a long period in custody before the Applicants could have their applications examined, which would have a considerable negative effect on the children’s health and development. Therefore, according to the Migration Court of Appeal a transfer of the Applicants under the circumstances was not consistent with the principle of the best interests of the children. With rejection of the Migration Agency’s complaint, the Applicants’ asylum applications were to be examined in Sweden.

If an Applicant, whilst his asylum application is being processed, is held in a limited area, this may be in contravention of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). In determining this, the Court may take into account all of the circumstances of the case, in particular the nature, period and effect of the holding of the Applicant and how the holding of the Applicant is enforced.

Limiting the possibility to access classified information to the third country national does not automatically mean that their right to an effective remedy with regard to a return order was infringed. By the same token there has been no infringement of Article 47 of the Charter.

The request for a preliminary ruling reads as follows: “Should Article 32 (3) of the Visa Code interpreted in light of Recital 29 of the preamble and Article 47 of the Charter be understood as creating an obligation for a Member State to guarantee the right to an effective remedy before a court?”

In the opinion of the Supreme Administrative Court the wording of Article 32 (3) of the Visa Code does not provide clarity as to whether the EU legislator intended to give the term “appeal” the meaning of any measure envisaged in national law or to give the right to an effective remedy before a respective court. If the CJEU, in the preliminary reference proceedings, states that the right to “appeal” should be exercised before a court, the national law excluding judicial control with regard to the Consulate’s decisions refusing the issuance of a visa would be contrary to Article 47 of the Charter, as well as the principle of equivalence and effectiveness.

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN) based on the fact that it did not meet its duty to actively cooperate in drawing up the facts that support the claim of the applicant.

This case dealt with the issue of whether the Secretary of State’s certification of the asylum claims of the two independent applicants as “clearly unfounded” was flawed on public law grounds, and the important difference between a decision on refugee status itself and a decision on a claim being “clearly unfounded”.
 

The Royal Decree of 11th May 2015 was quashed to the extent that it included Albania in the list of "safe" countries for the purposes of article 57/6/1, paragraph 4, of the law of 15th December 1980.

The Court of Appeal in Warsaw and the court of the first instance agreed that the detention of the applicant and her two children was unlawful from the moment the respective court decided on prolonging their detention as irregular migrants, although they have already applied for international protection.

Both courts agreed also that the amount of compensation for unlawful detention is dependent on the degree in which the state contributed to the trauma of the applicants and their inconvenience. In the present case, taking into account the available psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s opinions, the Courts decided that the poor health condition of the applicants was to a great extent caused by traumatic events experienced before coming to Poland – which eventually resulted in granting them refugee status.

However, the Court of Appeal decided to significantly increase the amount of compensation granted to the applicants, especially children, who were particularly vulnerable in this situation. 

AA claims he was unlawfully detained from 17 February 2015 to 27 February 2015 because he was detained as an unaccompanied child in a way contrary to paragraph 18B Schedule 2 of the Immigration Act 1971.

The decision turned on whether the word “child” in the Immigration Act 1971 was to be interpreted objectively (i.e. is the individual, in physical fact, under 18) or whether the detention’s legality involved the reasonable belief of the immigration officer that the individual is under 18.

The detention of an asylum-seeker who claimed he had been tortured because of his sexual orientation was unlawful in part.