Case summaries
The CJEU ruling concerned the scope of protection available under EU law to third country nationals suffering from serious illness whose removal would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. The CJEU surmisedthat the removal of a person suffering a serious illness to a country where appropriate treatment was not available could in exceptional circumstances be contrary to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in such circumstances their removal had to be suspended pursuant to Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. The Directive 2008/115/EC required the provision of emergency health care and essential treatment of illness to be made available to such persons during the period in which the Member State is required to postpone their removal.
The CJEU ruling concerned the scope of protection available under EU law to third country nationals suffering from serious illness whose removal would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. The CJEU ruled that, although the removal of a seriously ill person could in exceptional circumstances amount to a breach of Article 3 ECHR, the Qualification Directive (2004/83/EC) is to be interpreted as not requiring a Member State to grant the social welfare and health care benefits to a third country national who has been granted leave to reside in the territory of that Member State under national legislation.
The appellant sought to have the decision of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Public Order annulled, under which her previous application for her and her son to be recognised as refugees had been rejected. The Hellenic Council of State rejected the current appeal, due to the fact that the appellant had invoked financial reasons for leaving Syria and as such, had no legal basis to be recognised as a refugee.
The internal protection alternative is not only possible when the security situation in the proposed area is so poor that the threshold of serious harm would be met, but also when the applicant cannot reasonably be expected to settle down in a designated area. In order to establish the latter it is not enough to hypothetically assume that the applicant can arrange the housing by himself and take care of his social and economic security or that as a young man he could find work and survive. It is necessary to determine whether in the place of IPA, economic and social existence is assured at least to the extent that the threshold for a violation of Article 3 of the Convention is not met.
The Supreme Court held that an immigrant whose passport or equivalent identity document reveals their minority cannot be subjected to additional tests in order to determine his age unless a proportionality judgment about the document’s reliability has first been carried out. The Court also held that medical techniques to determine an age cannot be applied indiscriminately.
A claim challenging the refusal to grant a visa -in order to claim asylum on French territory- qualifies as being urgent. The consular authority is not qualified to assess the asylum claim.
The case concerns the interpretation of Directive 2004/83 and clarifies that the Irish legislation requiring seekers of international protection to follow two separate procedural stages: application for refugee status, and in case of refusal, application for subsidiary protection, is not contrary to EU law if the two applications can be introduced at the same time and if the application for subsidiary protection is considered within a reasonable period of time.
The right to good administration includes the right of any person to have his or her affairs handled impartially and within a reasonable period of time.
An application for international protection lodged by an Afghan who illegally entered Austria was rejected. The Court found that the applicant had no well-founded fear of persecution in his country of origin nor was he to be granted the subsidiary protection status.
The Asylum Court upheld the Federal Asylum Agency’s rejection of the mother and son’s application on the basis that Poland was responsible for the application under the Dublin II Regulation. The Court held that Austria was not obliged to apply Article 3(2) Dublin II Regulation due to a threatened violation of Article 3 or Article 8 ECHR.
Interventions from third parties to proceedings initiated before the National Asylum Court may be admitted.
A person with refugee status in one European Union state who applies for refugee status in a second European Union state is presumed to have unfounded fears relating to lack of protection. However, that presumption may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary.