Case summaries

The applicant claimed asylum in November 2009 alleging a well founded fear of persecution for reasons of race and religion. The application was refused by the Ministry of Interior on the grounds that the application did not amount to persecution in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention. On appeal, the High National Court re-examined the application and held that the conflict which had arisen in the Ivory Coast had to be taken into account and on that basis subsidiary protection should be granted.

The court found that a prohibition of deportation under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act (corresponding to Art. 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive) was established due to the existence of a general risk of persecution in case of return to Syria. The Administrative Court, in their assessment of risk, went far beyond the prevailing case law, particularly that of the High Administrative Courts.

A particular mode of persecution cannot be detected in Syria due to the arbitrariness and the juxtaposition of different intelligence services, whose impact cannot be predicted.

A further deterioration of the situation has occurred in light of recent developments and the bloody suppression of the protest movements.

Currently even persons who have not been politically active in exile are, with considerable probability, at risk of being arrested on return, not only for a short period - they are also at risk of torture and other inhuman treatment.

It is in principle possible for men to be persecuted on account of their gender. However, classifying the punishment for extramarital sex in Afghanistan as persecution on account of both membership of the group of men and the group of women would cover the entire society and renders the definition meaningless. Therefore, the applicant was not granted refugee status but his deportation was prohibited under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act / Art 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive.

The fact that one of the grounds for requesting asylum was to legalise residency in the Czech Republic was not sufficient in itself to allow the application to be deemed unfounded.

The Ministry of Interior must address all factual statements made, even if not formally named as grounds for the asylum application.

This Judicial Review concerned the way in which the Minister for Justice should assess applications for subsidiary protection and, in particular, whether the duty to ‘co-operate’ with the applicant  referred to in Art 4.1 of the Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC means that the decision maker must communicate matters of concern to the applicant before making a final decision. As there appeared to be a conflict between the Irish and Dutch interpretations of Art 4.1, and uncertainty as to the true meaning of the phrase ‘in co-operation with’ the Court (Hogan J) referred a question to the CJEU.

The applicant could not substantiate the individual elements of his claim with respect to his well-founded fear of a blood feud; however, he was able to satisfy the criteria for subsidiary protection. As a result of the armed conflict that was ongoing in the respective province in his country of origin (Ghazni, Afghanistan), the high intensity of the indiscriminate violence was deemed to be sufficient to be a threatening factor to the applicant’s life. As a result, the criteria of subsidiary protection were fulfilled.

The question of whether the current situation in Iraq is an internal armed conflict (nationwide or regionally) according to Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act/Art. 15 (c) Qualification Directive was left open. Even if one assumes that such a conflict takes place, subsidiary protection is only to be granted if the applicant is exposed to a serious and individual threat to life or physical integrity “in the course of” such a conflict. This cannot be established regarding the applicant in the present case.

The situation which prevails today in some geographical areas of Somalia, in particular in and around Mogadishu, must be seen as a situation of generalised violence resulting from a situation of internal armed conflict, in the meaning of Article L.712-1 c) Ceseda [which transposes Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive].

The Court found that the province of Ghazni, Afghanistan was still unstable and unsafe for the local population due to the presence of an internal armed conflict. However the security situation in Kabul had not deteriorated to the extent to be classified as an internal armed conflict.

The case concerned an appeal against a decision of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) to refuse a claim for subsidiary protection status on the grounds that the applicant was excluded as a result of his activities, which were considered ‘contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.’ The appeal was successful, the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) held that exclusion clauses must be interpreted restrictively, that there must be ‘serious grounds to believe’ such acts were carried out and notwithstanding the exclusion clause, non refoulement obligations under Art 3 of the ECHR apply.