Case summaries

Instead of rejecting the application, the Court granted subsidiary protection status to the single female Applicant and her minor children, as their return to the country of origin would lead to the risk of serious harm (indiscriminate violence).

The age of the child and the mental state of the Applicant as well as the ban on more detailed questioning on the reasons for fleeing in the initial police interview should have been taken into account to a greater extent when assessing the assertion of flight. The lack of discussion of these aspects represents a failure to investigate several decisive points, which made the decision by the Asylum Court arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional

This case concerned the assessment and reason given that the Applicant had not been subjected to “serious harm” in the past, in circumstances where the decision was unclear as to whether the finding was to the effect that his account was not believed, or whether, if believed, the harm was not inflicted by persons who were "actors of serious harm". The Court also considered the definition of “actors of serious harm.” Thirdly, the Court considered whether the decision-maker ignored the specific claim made in the application that returned asylum seekers face a risk of detention, interrogation and torture such as would amount to "serious harm".

Two appeals have been made - by the asylum seeker and the State representative – to the Supreme Court against the judgment given by the High National Court which partially upheld the appeal filed against the Ministry of the Interior’s decision to deny international protection to an Ivorian national.   The High National Court’s decision, while denying refugee status, granted the applicant permission to reside in Spain under Article 17(2) of the Asylum Law (humanitarian considerations).The asylum seeker requests that his refugee status be recognised.The Public Prosecutor requests that the permit to reside in Spain on grounds of humanitarian considerations be retracted.The Supreme Court decided to maintain the applicant’s residence permit on grounds of humanitarian considerations on the basis of the updated country of origin information and the consequent risk to the person’s life or physical integrity.

There is not currently an indiscriminate conflict in Afghanistan (as a whole, or in any province) within the meaning of Article 15(c). Internal protection is in general possible in Kabul; however it is unreasonable to expect certain categories of women to seek internal protection within Afghanistan.

Article L. 712(1) (b) of the CESEDA requires the asylum judge to examine whether the circumstances allow the risks referred to in this provision to be regarded as proven. The protection provided for in this Article is only granted where there is a real, rather than possible, risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of a return to the Applicant’s country of origin. 

Application for annulment of a decision by the Minister of Public Order.

This case concerned special protection status in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention andexclusion from protection of those who have committed a serious crime under “common law”. The crime committed by the applicant (attempted murder of the Indian Ambassador in Romania) does not fall within the concepts of “political”, “composite” or “related” crimes, even if it was carried out because of the offender's political opinions or principles, or with the intent of achieving such aims. The implementation of the exclusion clause is not precluded because of the fact that the party has already served the sentence which was imposed. The judgment regarding the applicant having committed a serious criminal offence was justified. The decision was opposed by a minority. Consideration was given to the severity of the persecution the applicant risked suffering should he return to India and non-refoulement was approved, his deportation was given suspensive effect, and he was given temporary leave to remain on humanitarian grounds.

In an application for judicial review, the High Court found that the Minister had not erred in relying on the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) finding as to credibility in a case where the Applicant’s claimed conversion from Islam to Christianity was found to have been in bad faith and solely in order to ground his applications for international protection. As the ‘conversion’ was not genuine, the Court held that there was no reason to believe it would come to the notice of the Afghani authorities should the Applicant be returned. This rendered it unnecessary to subsequently consider whether the Applicant would be at risk of serious harm by the authorities.

The Afghan applicant was granted subsidiary protection status during the court proceedings. The authority must make sure that the applicant is not at risk of serious harm or persecution in the relevant part of the country, not only at the time the application is assessed but also that this is not likely to occur in the future either. Countries struggling with armed conflicts do not normally provide safe internal flight options within the country, as the movement of front lines can put areas at risk that were previously considered safe.

The High Court held that the Minister is entitled in a subsidiary protection application to rely on the findings made during the refugee status determination process unless these findings are legally wrong or the reasoning is defective. The Applicant cannot “collaterally attack” the findings of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) (which have not otherwise been challenged) through a judicial review of the subsidiary protection decision. The lapse of time amounting to almost one year between the oral hearing by the RAT and the issuing of its decision, could not be challenged in the context of seeking to review the subsequent subsidiary protection decision, and the reliance by the Minister on the RAT’s use of an expert medical report was permissible.