Case summaries

In the opinion of the appellate court, one of the conditions required under Section 19(1)(i) of the Asylum Act for ruling that there is no need to adjudicate was not fulfilled. Despite the existence of a final decision dismissing the application as manifestly unfounded, it was not possible to agree with the opinion of the administrative authorities, as upheld by the Regional Court, that the facts had not changed substantially.

The applicant sought to rely on her Islamic proxy marriage to her husband, a recognised refugee in Ireland, to resist removal to the UK under the Dublin Regulations. Her application for judicial review failed as she was held to have forfeited her right under Article 7 of the Dublin II Regulation due to delay on her part in asserting that right.

The applicant was not permitted to raise a new ground of claim based on her asserted homosexuality, when she had had numerous opportunities to raise this ground of claim earlier.  The applicant was however granted leave to apply for judicial review, upon the Judge noting a factual error that had tainted the State’s earlier credibility assessment. 

The applicant applied to the Minister to be readmitted to the asylum system many years after he had made a first application for refugee status which had been refused for non-attendance at a refugee interview. There was no new claim as such nor was there any new evidence to support the application. The Court found that the Minister was only required to decide whether what was adduced was ‘new’. The Minister’s obligation was not altered by the fact that the original application had not been fully processed but had been abandoned by the applicant and deemed withdrawn. An applicant is not entitled to exploit his own failure to prosecute his original application in order to compel the Minister to consent to what is, in effect a reopening of the original claim with no new evidence, argument elements or findings. The Court also found that Art 32 of the Procedures Directive did not assist the applicant and, in any event, there was no claim of ‘direct effect’ made on his behalf.

The General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order, having had an application for asylum referred back to it, considered whether the submitted evidence was “new and crucial”. If so, an ab initio examination of the application would be ordered. Failure to give notification of an act does not affect its validity, but only the start of the deadline for submitting an application for its annulment. The copy of the Turkish Government Gazette which promulgated the decision regarding withdrawal of the Applicant's nationality, was new and crucial evidence. There was no justification for refusing the request for an ab initio examination of the Applicant's circumstances, nor for rejecting his application to remain in the country on humanitarian grounds.

Conversion to Christianity led to a re-examination of impediments to enforcement.

The involuntary return of an applicant, who did not intend to abandon his/her asylum application, to his/her country of origin results in the temporary interruption of the assessment of his/her case by the Court as the remedy does not temporarily have any ground.

The Supreme Court does not consider an assessment of the Applicant as an untrustworthy person to be justifiable where it is based only on the fact that he failed to mention all of the details of the case immediately in the admission interview, providing them gradually instead, as the Applicant‘s claims are logical, consistent, and in line with the situation in the country of origin. The argument of untrustworthiness can be used only in situations where there are additional factors indicating that the facts asserted by the Applicant are not true, and that has not been demonstrated in the case in question.

During the refugee status proceedings, the administrative authorities should clarify on what grounds a foreign husband has received protection in another country. These circumstances should be assessed consistently in two countries.

There are no objective reasons why the respective positions of two individuals should be viewed differently merely because they have applied for refugee status in two different democratic countries that respect human rights.

The applicant was eligible for subsidiary protection as an internal armed conflict is taking place in Logar. The applicant, in case of return to Afghanistan, could not relocate to Kabul, since he could not secure his livelihood there. In order to secure his livelihood, he could not rely on property which his family had possessed in the province of Logar.