Case summaries

The Supreme Court of Ireland handed down a judgment concerning the question whether the Minister for Justice and Equality is obliged to revoke a deportation order or otherwise facilitate a person to enter the State, when that person has been granted consent to make a subsequent application for international protection under section 22 of the International Protection Act 2015, which requires the person's presence in the State to make the application. It was held that there is no express right to enter the State for the purposes of making an application, save where the person is at its frontiers.

1. A change of the destination country in a return decision by an administrative authority should be regarded as a new return decision requiring an effective remedy in compliance with Article 47 CFREU.

2. The national legislation providing for a safe transit country ground applicable in the present case is contrary to EU law.

3. The obligation imposed on a third-country national to remain permanently in a closed and limited transit zone, within which their movement is limited and monitored, and which the latter cannot legally leave voluntarily, in any direction whatsoever, constitutes a deprivation of liberty, characterised as "detention" within the meaning of the Reception Conditions (RCD) and Returns Directives (RD).

4. Neither the RCD nor Article 43 of the Asylum Procedures Directive authorise detention in transit zones for a period exceeding four weeks.

5. Detention under the RCD and the RD must comply with the relevant guarantees under EU law including being based on a reasoned detention decision; consisting of a measure of last resort, following an individualised assessment of the case, its necessity and proportionality; and effective judicial review should be available. An applicant for international protection cannot be held in detention solely on the ground that they cannot support themselves. Where detention is found to contravene EU law, domestic courts may release the applicant and order the authorities to provide accommodation in line with the RCD provisions. They are empowered to do so, even if they have no clear jurisdiction under national law.

The Spanish Supreme Court’s Administrative Chamber decides on the appeal of the State Attorney. He appealed the National Court’s judgement that accepted to consider an application for the re-examination of international protection that was denied in first instance, and was presented in a different place. The Supreme Court concludes that even if an application is not presented before the competent authority, are these authorities the ones who have to refer the case to the competent. Since this referral was not done, the petition for re-examination is valid.

CJEU rules that Hungarian national law which defines ‘serious crime’ (in the context of exclusion from subsidiary protection) as a crime with a possible custodial of 5 years sentence as incompatible with the Qualification Directive. Instead, each crime must be looked at on an individual basis to ascertain its “seriousness”.  

The carrying out of a transfer does not, in itself, definitively establish the responsibility of the Member State to which the person concerned has been transferred.

A Member State, to which an applicant has returned after being transferred, is not allowed to transfer that person anew to the requested Member State without respecting a take back procedure. In those circumstances, a take back request must be submitted within the periods prescribed in Article 24(2) of the Dublin III Regulation, which begins to run from the time the requesting Member State becomes aware of the presence of the person concerned on its territory.

The National Court for the Right of Asylum (CNDA) has a responsibility to follow the general rules on closing files. Where this is not done, the Court can be found negligent.  

Where the ECtHR has, under Article 39 of the ECHR, granted interim measures prohibiting the Government from deporting the Applicant, this does not impact the ability of national courts to rule on the Applicant’s claim to asylum. The interim measures are binding on national authorities only.

1. An application for asylum lodged in Germany only qualifies as a subsequent application within the meaning of section 71a of the Asylum Act, interpreted in conformity with the constitution, if the first asylum procedure in a country that is generally determined to be a safe third country has actually been conducted in compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This is not the case, where, at the time of the decision, there have been systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedures of the third country which have put the applicant at risk of an inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 3 of the ECHR.

2. The procedure to determine whether a second asylum procedure is to be conducted also requires a personal interview of the applicant. Such an interview is only dispensable where the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (Federal Office) can either decide on the basis of the information received on the merits of the decision whether the new application constitutes a new submission or assess already on the basis of the detailed written explanations of the applicant reliably and safely that the submission is clearly and manifestly inconsistent.

Based on the principle of effectiveness, the CJEU ruled that a limit of 15 days to apply for subsidiary protection following a notification of the decision not to grant refugee status is particularly short and cannot be justified by the need to ensure an effective return procedure. The limited period endangers applicants’ ability to submit an application for subsidiary protection.

Arranging for medical or psychological examination is required, for example, when the third country national indicates that they were subject to violence, which left physical or mental signs which can be confirmed by medical or psychological examination. Not all invoked health problems will require an exam. Moreover, in subsequent proceedings this obligation is limited. The authority has no basis to arrange for such an examination when the event indicated in the subsequent application related to violence which was already subject to examination in the first asylum proceedings and was considered to not be credible.