Case summaries

These joint cases concern Article 1F(c) of the Refugee Convention. The Court considered what acts fall within the exclusion and what is meant by "serious reasons for considering" a person to be guilty of acts contrary to the purposes of the United Nations (“UN”). 

An Iraqi man, previously a member of the Ba'ath Party, was granted refugee status. There were not found to be any grounds for exclusion. The man's son was also granted refugee status, with reference to the principle of family unity.

The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees contains a finite list of grounds on which refugee status may be recognised and does not include victims of war, natural disasters, or famine, family situation, unemployment, lack of educational opportunities, or poverty.

The assessment of whether the foreignor's fear of persecution is justified must therefore be performed with reference to the individual case in question and in the light of the general social, legal, political, and economic situation of the country of origin of the foreignor applying for refugee status.

This cases concerns the interpretation of Article 2(c) and Article 9(1)(a) of the Qualification Directive in a case where the two Applicants are Pakistani nationals who are members of the Ahmadi religious community and fear persecution there on the basis of religion.

This case concerned exclusion from refugee status on the basis of a war crime and a serious non-political crime.

A Chechen who was involved in the Second Chechen War - outside of the general combat action - in the killing and wounding of Russian soldiers and the kidnapping of a Russian officer to force the release of another Chechen is at risk of being exposed to torture or at least inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the Russian Federation. 

The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the appellant against the High National Court’s decision to reject the appellant’s administrative appeal against the denial of his application for refugee status. 

The appellant is a Columbian national and claims to fear political persecution if he is returned to his country because of threats from the FARC group (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) due to the appellant’s refusal to permit two of his sons to join the armed group.

 The Supreme Court rejects the appeal, affirming the High National Court’s decision to deny asylum.Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejects the appeal for protection on the grounds of humanitarian considerations as contained in Spanish Law.   

The shifting of the burden of proof according to Article 4 (4) of the Qualification Directive applies if the Applicant refers to previous acts of persecution or threats as an indicator of the well-foundedness of his fear that persecution would resume if he were to return to his home country.

If it is assumed that the individual concerned was under immediate threat of persecution associated with his ethnicity when he left his home country, then the link is not simply with the ethnicity of the individual concerned (Chechen in this case), but also with the enmity generally expressed by the persecuting security forces against this ethnic group and their presumed political convictions.

The authorities of first and second instance—the Head of the Office for Foreigners and the Polish Council for Refugees—refused to grant refugee status or other forms of protection to an applicant from Uganda who had applied for refugee status because of his sexual orientation. They made the same decisions but on fundamentally different grounds and factual findings. The  first instance authority found that the applicant was homosexual but that the information about the country of origin indicated that his fear was not well-founded. The  second instance authority found that homosexuals are at risk of persecution in Uganda but that the applicant was not homosexual, and the opinion of a doctor who is a sexologist did not prove sexual orientation. Instead, this needed to be proved based on the testimony of the applicant, which is then verified in the context of his general credibility during the proceedings.

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.  

1. Changes in the home country are only considered to be sufficiently significant and non-temporary if the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded.
2. Based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which applies to the concept of “real risk” according to Article 3 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), a uniform standardof probability is applied to assessing the likelihood of persecution in the context of refugee protection; this corresponds to the standard of substantial probability.