Case summaries
Following on from a request by several French NGOs to annul Decree No. 2017-430 of 29 March 2017 containing various provisions relating to the allowance for asylum seekers, the French Council of State annuls Article 6(2) of the Decree since it does not set in the Code on the entry and residence of aliens and the right of asylum (CESDA) an additional daily amount sufficient to enable adult asylum seekers who have accepted an offer of care, but to whom no accommodation place can be offered, to have accommodation on the private rental market.
The applicant, a victim of rape and forced marriage, has a subjective right to reception which allows her to live a life compatible with human dignity in light of her vulnerability and the minimum norms of reception. This right is entirely linked with FEDASIL’s competences to ensure reception is adapted to an individual’s circumstances. The statement of the asbl SOS VIOL clearly justifies why the applicant should be accommodated in a Local Reception Initiative, reception which is better adapted to the symptoms that she suffers from, notably anxiety and fear of men.The criticism of the asbl's statement whilist not providing any pschological assessment themselves, meant that FEDASIL’s decision not to transfer the applicant to adapted accommodation was negligent.
The applicant is entitled to be transferred to individual accommodation and moral damages in the region of 2.500 euros.
The Refugee Appeals Board reversed the Danish Immigration Service decision to Dublin Transfer a female asylum seeker and her two minor children to Italy. The Board found that a transfer to Italy could amount to a breach of Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as reception conditions in Italy are subject to certain shortcomings and the asylum seeker and her two minor children were considered to be extremely vulnerable.
The decision of the Administrative Court of Düsseldorf prohibits a Dublin transfer of an asylum seeker from Germany to Greece stating that there are substantial grounds for believing that systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in Greece could put the applicant at risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, in violation of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
The case concerns the validity of the first subparagraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of the Receptions Conditions Directive in the light of Article 6 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The reduction in the financial allowance available to child dependants of asylum seekers was not contrary to the requirement that the best interests of the child be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children.
It was unlawful to detain an unaccompanied asylum seeking child, even in the reasonable belief that he was an adult.
The application of S.C. and her minor children Z.C. and F.C. related to the cassation of an Appeal Court judgement regarding compensation for the harm they suffered as a result of an indisputably unjust decision to place the Applicants in a Guarded Detention Centre for Foreigners. The Supreme Court reversed the challenged judgement and passed the case to the Appeal Court for re-consideration.
Even where there are no substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the Member State responsible, a Dublin transfer can only be carried out in conditions which exclude the possibility that that transfer might result in a real and proven risk of the person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 CFR EU.
If there is a real and proven risk that the state of health of an applicant who suffers from a serious mental or physical illness would significantly and permanently deteriorate, that transfer would constitute a violation of Article 4 CFR EU.
It is for the courts and authorities of the requesting Member State to eliminate any serious doubts concerning the impact of the transfer on the health of the person concerned by taking all necessary precaution. If the taking of precautions is not sufficient, it is for the authorities of the Member State concerned to suspend the execution of the transfer for as long as the applicant’s conditions render him unfit for transfer.
Member States may choose to conduct its own examination of that person’s application by making use of the “discretionary clause” laid down in Article 17(1) DRIII, but is not required to do so.
This case concerned the back dating of child benefit for families who were previously in the asylum procedure.