Case summaries

After the case has been referred back to the Respondent, it will examine whether the Appellant only formally converted to Christianity and how he might prove that he was also putting his conversion into practice through his life and actions as a result of which his return to Iran would be excluded. In taking evidence on this question, the Respondent must cooperate with persons and bodies that might provide relevant information concerning the Appellant – for example, clergymen, Christian associations, churches and the like.

“The applicant bears the burden of the argument against the administrative authority, hereinafter referred to as the burden of proof. It is not, however, the duty of the asylum applicant to demonstrate his persecution by means other than his own credible testimony.”

“Where the testimony of an applicant for international protection submitted during proceedings can be identified as consistent and in accordance with the information available on the country of origin, in spite of minor inconsistencies, then such testimony must be relied on.”

The case refers to an appeal to the Supreme Court brought by the appellant against the High National Court’s decision to deny asylum.

The appellant is a Syrian national of Kurdish ethnicity and claims to be affiliated to the Kurdish political party “Azadi Akrad Siria” and to carry out political propaganda activities on their behalf.The Court affirms the denial of asylum and furthermore excludes the appellant from having the status of refugee sur place, even though the situation in Syria has changed since the application for asylum was lodged.However, taking into account the severe deterioration of the socio-political situation in Syria, the Supreme Court recognises the appellant’s right to remain in Spain on humanitarian grounds.

This case concerned the assessment and reason given that the Applicant had not been subjected to “serious harm” in the past, in circumstances where the decision was unclear as to whether the finding was to the effect that his account was not believed, or whether, if believed, the harm was not inflicted by persons who were "actors of serious harm". The Court also considered the definition of “actors of serious harm.” Thirdly, the Court considered whether the decision-maker ignored the specific claim made in the application that returned asylum seekers face a risk of detention, interrogation and torture such as would amount to "serious harm".

This case involved recognition of refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on grounds of religious beliefs.

More specifically, it was held that the arrest and torture the Applicant suffered at the hands of his father and the State authorities because of his Christian faith, the risk of being executed for apostasy because he was baptised in Greece, and the risk of being arrested and maltreated again should he return to Iran, constituted persecution under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the actor of persecution being the State. Furthermore, being forced to conceal one's religious beliefs and/or proclaim belief in another religionin order to avoid persecution and/or deprivation of basic rights constitutes a breach of religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR and also the related case law of the ECtHR.

The third action in a row brought by a foreign woman for refugee status ended in the issue of a judgment dismissing the case as it was found that the basis for the application was the same as in the previous cases and the application was therefore inadmissible. The Court overturned the negative decision by the Polish Council for Refugees, as the new application by the foreign woman stated that she had divorced her then husband and had been in a relationship for a year with a Polish citizen, which might cause persecution on religious grounds were she to return to her country of origin.

In an application for judicial review, the High Court found that the Minister had not erred in relying on the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) finding as to credibility in a case where the Applicant’s claimed conversion from Islam to Christianity was found to have been in bad faith and solely in order to ground his applications for international protection. As the ‘conversion’ was not genuine, the Court held that there was no reason to believe it would come to the notice of the Afghani authorities should the Applicant be returned. This rendered it unnecessary to subsequently consider whether the Applicant would be at risk of serious harm by the authorities.

The Plaintiff’s previous experience does not lead to the  conclusion that the Plaintiff is afraid of persecution (in the event that he was returned) based on race, religion, national identity, membership of a particular social group or a certain political belief, as his fear is based on the possible consequences of retribution merely because he fled. According to the judgment of the Supreme Court the fact that he fled from the Taliban does not make him a “member of a particular social group” on the basis of which his refugee status could be recognised.

Because the Plaintiff did not mention his current political conviction and his current anti-Taliban religious belief when applying for international protection he is not entitled to a refugee sur place status. 

A Muslim asylum seeker and his/her spouse joined Jehovah’s Witnesses in Finland – a religious community.  In their home country, Iran, converting away from Islam can mean a death sentence.  The Administrative Court should not have been allowed to deny the application without an oral hearing in which further information could have been given regarding the Applicants’ conversion to Christianity and the consequences thereof in their home country.

The Applicant fled to Austria to be with her husband. She pleaded no reasons for fleeing such as problems of living as a woman in Afghanistan and the Federal Asylum Agency also made no investigations into this aspect. Only in the appeal were specific women’s issues raised. The Asylum Court decided that the Federal Asylum Agency was obliged to undertake the appropriate investigations under apparent theoretical circumstances relevant to asylum (such as gender), even if the party did not initiate such a submission.