Case summaries

This case concerns Art. 23 of Directive 2005/85/EC and the possibility of prioritising the processing of asylum applications by persons belonging to a certain category defined on the basis of nationality or country of origin. The case also deals with the right to an effective judicial remedy under Art. 39 of Directive 2005/85/EC and the concept of ‘court or Tribunal’ within the meaning of that article.

While an appeal against a refusal to grant international protection is pending, it is unlawful to expel an applicant before the decision on the case has been issued. The foreign national who has been expelled is entitled to a document that will allow his re-entry into Italy.

The Court granted permission to the Applicants to seek judicial review of the negative decision made in a written appeal (rather than an oral appeal) in an application for refugee status made by a South African one-parent family. The decision to allow a written appeal was based on the status of South Africa as a ‘safe country,’ and the appeal decision was based on personal credibility and the absence of a nexus to Convention grounds. The Applicants failed in their argument that the absence of an oral hearing may render the appeal decision unlawful by reference to the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed by the Asylum Procedures Directive, because the Applicants had in fact availed of the appeal rather than challenge the fact that it was confined to a written appeal. Leave to seek judicial review was granted on the basis that an aspect of the claim which was disclosed after the first instance decision was not properly considered; that the decision maker made exaggerated credibility findings to the potential detriment of a subsequent subsidiary protection application; and erred in the consideration of country of origin information and evidence of the availability of internal protection.

The Council of State found that a decision to extend the detention of a foreigner was a decision which adversely affected the individual. The principle enshrined in EU law of the rights of the defence applies to the preparation for this decision. Under this principle, according to the Council of State, the facts and circumstances forming the basis for the extension decision must be explained expressly and clearly to the foreigner, along with the legal consequences of the decision. Furthermore, a representative must be notified of the intention to issue a decision to extend detention of the foreigner, to enable the representative to support the foreigner in his response to the extension decision.

This case deals with whether an applicant, in a system where refugee status determination and subsidiary protection are examined separately, can require the administrative authorities in that State to supply them with the results of the assessment made in advance of a decision when it is proposed that such an application should be refused. The CJEU held that the obligation to cooperation under Article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive cannot be interpreted in that way but in such a separate system the fundamental rights of the Applicant must be respected and in particular the principle of the right to be heard.

The option for the CNDA to determine certain cases without involving a collegiate decision was consistent with French, European and International law and the Applicant did not need to be notified of the intention to use this procedure. 

Where information used by the National Asylum Court (CNDA) to reach its decision is information concerning the asylum seeker’s specific situation, it must be kept on file so that the parties can take note of it and discuss it.

When assessing the application for international protection the Ministry of Interior (MI) did not take into account the Applicant’s youth, lack of education and background. The MI did not conduct the procedure and pose questions in a manner that was suitable to the Applicant’s age and personality.

The country of origin information that the Applicant submitted only in his appeal against the decision should be accepted as this is generally available information that MI could have obtained on its own.

The appeal authority is obliged to assess the case on the basis of all the evidence and to provide proper grounds for its decision. It is not sufficient, therefore, to state in general terms that the second-instance authority shares the position of the head of the Polish Office for Foreigners and the arguments put forward by him. If the principle of two-instance administrative proceedings is to be observed, it is not enough to assert that two decisions by two authorities of different rank were issued in the given case.