Case summaries

Granting someone a refugee status for fear of persecution based on belonging to a social group due to his sexual orientation, cannot be linked to the fact that his sexual orientation has, or not, been made public. Indeed, a social group is instituted by how society perceive those in the group.

An individual applying for asylum does not have, in order to avoid persecutions in his country, to hide his sexual orientation.

In order to prove the risk of persecution, there is no requirement that belonging to a social group based on sexual orientation must be prohibited by any criminal law in the country of origin of the applicant. In fact, this risk can be based on abusive common law provisions, or behaviours, whether they are supported, facilitated or merely tolerated by the country’s authorities.

The applicant, a minor, an Afghan citizen, ethnic Pashtun and a Sunni Muslim from Chahar Dara district in Kunduz Province, feared if returned to Afghanistan he would be killed or forcibly recruited by the Taliban.

The Board notes that the applicant is 15 years old, Pashtun, illiterate and the eldest son of the family where the father was killed in 2015. Further, the Board notes that according to country of origin information it is credible that the Taliban recruits young men and boys in Chahar Dara.

With reference to the applicant being a minor and without a network the Board did not find the internal flight alternative relevant or reasonable.

The Board hereafter found that the applicant had rendered probable that if returned to Afghanistan he would risk suffering serious harm covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (2) and granted the applicant subsidiary protection under this article.

In this case, the Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal against a High Court Judgment in which the Refugee Appeals Tribunal was found to have erred in law in its approach to determining persecution. The Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal on the basis that the tribunal member’s finding of no risk of persecution was not unreasonable (within the applicable standards of judicial review) and that the High Court was incorrect in finding that the extent of educational discrimination at issue in this case met the threshold of persecution required.

This case dealt with the extent to which in the case of a child the prospect of discrimination could amount to a real risk of persecution sufficient to found a successful asylum claim in a situation where a comparably placed adult would not be at such a risk. 

In the course of an asylum procedure, the statements of the asylum seeker have to be assessed integrally. This includes, inter alia, an analysis of (up-to-date) country reports. However, such analysis is not carried out in a sufficient manner where there are only superficial references to the country of origin information. Rather, it is required that the information contained is actually taken into consideration when taking the decision, applied to the specific circumstances of each case and compared to the information provided by the asylum seeker(s).

If this is not the case, there are significant deficiencies in the administrative inquiry and the facts relevant for the decision are not fully established. Therefore, the contested decisions are to be annulled and the matters are to be referred back to the competent authorities for new decisions to be issued since there is no sufficient basis for a decision of an administrative court. 

The Spanish Supreme Court’s Administrative Chamber decides on the appeal of the applicant, whose application for international protection has been rejected. The Court solves the case reasoning that the situation in the country of origin has  improved from the moment the applicant lodged the application, and in addition, no sufficient proof of the said persecution was presented.

The Spanish Supreme Court’s Administrative Chamber decides on the appeal of an asylum applicant, whose application has been rejected.  The applicant states that upon return to his home country (Ivory Coast) he will suffer a risk of persecution.

However, both the National Court and the Supreme Court ruled that no risk of persecution exists in this case, because there is no enough evidence to conclude on that risk.

The Court of Appeal rejected a request rebutting the presumption of Turkey as a safe third country for a Syrian national of Armenian origin who resided there for one year and held a work permit, on the ground that general references to human rights violations and deficiencies in Turkey’s asylum system did not suffice to establish a real and individualised risk of persecution or indirect refoulement to Syria.

The case concerned an application for judicial review of the decisions made on behalf of the Secretary of State to transfer the applicants to Malta, on the basis that such jurisdiction was the proper place for considering the applicants’ asylum claims. The applicants argued that such transfer would violate their rights under Article 18 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) to have their asylum application determined within a reasonable time and on the basis of a fair procedure, as the Maltese asylum system had several shortcomings and contains procedures that are illusory or too slow. Dismissing the application, the Tribunal concluded that there was no evidence to support the argument that the applicants’ Article 18 rights would be violated if they were transferred to Malta. 

There is a well-founded fear of persecution based on membership of a particular social group in the case of an applicant who, even though he is not gay, he is perceived as such by his community, his family and the authorities in his country of origin.