Case summaries

This case dealt with the extent to which in the case of a child the prospect of discrimination could amount to a real risk of persecution sufficient to found a successful asylum claim in a situation where a comparably placed adult would not be at such a risk. 

In the course of an asylum procedure, the statements of the asylum seeker have to be assessed integrally. This includes, inter alia, an analysis of (up-to-date) country reports. However, such analysis is not carried out in a sufficient manner where there are only superficial references to the country of origin information. Rather, it is required that the information contained is actually taken into consideration when taking the decision, applied to the specific circumstances of each case and compared to the information provided by the asylum seeker(s).

If this is not the case, there are significant deficiencies in the administrative inquiry and the facts relevant for the decision are not fully established. Therefore, the contested decisions are to be annulled and the matters are to be referred back to the competent authorities for new decisions to be issued since there is no sufficient basis for a decision of an administrative court. 

The Spanish Supreme Court’s Administrative Chamber decides on the appeal of the applicant, whose application for international protection has been rejected. The Court solves the case reasoning that the situation in the country of origin has  improved from the moment the applicant lodged the application, and in addition, no sufficient proof of the said persecution was presented.

The Spanish Supreme Court’s Administrative Chamber decides on the appeal of an asylum applicant, whose application has been rejected.  The applicant states that upon return to his home country (Ivory Coast) he will suffer a risk of persecution.

However, both the National Court and the Supreme Court ruled that no risk of persecution exists in this case, because there is no enough evidence to conclude on that risk.

The Court of Appeal rejected a request rebutting the presumption of Turkey as a safe third country for a Syrian national of Armenian origin who resided there for one year and held a work permit, on the ground that general references to human rights violations and deficiencies in Turkey’s asylum system did not suffice to establish a real and individualised risk of persecution or indirect refoulement to Syria.

The case concerned an application for judicial review of the decisions made on behalf of the Secretary of State to transfer the applicants to Malta, on the basis that such jurisdiction was the proper place for considering the applicants’ asylum claims. The applicants argued that such transfer would violate their rights under Article 18 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) to have their asylum application determined within a reasonable time and on the basis of a fair procedure, as the Maltese asylum system had several shortcomings and contains procedures that are illusory or too slow. Dismissing the application, the Tribunal concluded that there was no evidence to support the argument that the applicants’ Article 18 rights would be violated if they were transferred to Malta. 

There is a well-founded fear of persecution based on membership of a particular social group in the case of an applicant who, even though he is not gay, he is perceived as such by his community, his family and the authorities in his country of origin. 

The Court found a violation of Article 3 in relation to a subsequent application for asylum, which had been rejected on the basis that it contained no new elements indicating that the Applicants ran a real risk of being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment on deportation to Russia. Because new information had in fact been provided, the national authorities were under an obligation to thoroughly review the information in order to assure themselves that the Applicants’ rights under Article 3 would be safeguarded.

The Iraqi Kurdish Applicant was placed in immigration detention, while waiting for the recipient statement of the Serbian authority on the basis of the readmission agreement. After the Serbian authority rejected the deportation towards Serbia, the OIN modified its decision regarding deportation towards the place of origin, to Iraq and prolonged the immigration detention of the Applicant.

The Court ruled that deportation towards Iraq cannot be carried out because of the prohibition of non-refoulement and terminated the immigration detention of the Applicant.

Deprivation of liberty as allowed by art. 5.1(f) of the Convention not only has to be with a view to deportation, but it also has to be in compliance with national law, and free from arbitrariness.

The submission of an asylum application does not as such imply that detention is no longer with a view to deportation.