Case summaries
The rescuing actor is not only responsible for the search and rescue operations but should also consider the safety of disembarkation points in line with the principle of non-refoulement. The Open Arms ship conducted a reasonable assessment of the situation during the rescue operation, given that Libya could not be considered a country where the rescued migrants could be safely returned and Italy had already communicated an available place of safety.
it should be assessed whether the migrants – if rescued by the Libyan authorities - would have been taken back to a country where there are ongoing severe violations of human rights. In the case at issue, Libya has to be considered such a country. the rescuing actor is not only responsible for the SAR operations but also for the designation of a POS (place of safety) for the migrants to be disembarked at. the principle of non-refoulement had to be applied. the decision to communicate with the Italian authorities, which were the first interlocutor with the Open Arms during the entire operation, including during the disembarking phase, is considered reasonable.
The Court found that due to the inexistence of the connection requirement between the applicant and the State of Ecuador, the latter cannot be considered a “safe third country” in light of Article 2 n.º1 point r) item i) of the Law 27/2008. Nonetheless, the international protection request should be rejected on the basis that Egypt is considered to be the first country of asylum, excluding the possibility of granting international protection under Article 19º-A n. º1 points c) and d) of the Law 26/14.
The State Secretary for Security and Justice rejects an application for temporary asylum residence permits by two Syrian minors based on the finding that Lebanon is a Safe Third Country for the applicants. The Court of The Hague rules that the State Secretary failed to sufficiently motivate his decision, as article 3.106a(1)(e) of the Aliens Decree was not taken into account.
The Administrative Chamber of the Spanish Supreme Court decides on the inadmissibility of the appeal an applicant for international protection submitted of a judgement that denied him the right of asylum and subsidiary protection.
The Supreme Court concludes there is no legal reasoning to admit the appeal, because what the National Court concluded was well-founded.
The case concerned an application for judicial review of the decisions made on behalf of the Secretary of State to transfer the applicants to Malta, on the basis that such jurisdiction was the proper place for considering the applicants’ asylum claims. The applicants argued that such transfer would violate their rights under Article 18 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) to have their asylum application determined within a reasonable time and on the basis of a fair procedure, as the Maltese asylum system had several shortcomings and contains procedures that are illusory or too slow. Dismissing the application, the Tribunal concluded that there was no evidence to support the argument that the applicants’ Article 18 rights would be violated if they were transferred to Malta.
The Constitutional Court ruled that Member States are obliged to examine all circumstances which are important from the perspective of the principle of non-refoulement, when deciding on a Dublin transfer to a responsible Member State. Due to the absolute nature of the protection afforded by the principle of non-refoulement, the assessment must take into account all the circumstances of the particular case, including the applicant's personal situation in the transferring country. In this context, it should also be assessed whether the mere removal of an individual to another country due to their health status is contrary to the requirements arising from the principle of non-refoulement. Thus, when the Supreme Court did not consider the circumstances that are important in terms of respect of the principle of non-refoulement, it infringed the applicants' right to equal protection under article 22 of the Constitution.
Asylum seekers cannot be rejected at the border crossing without having the possibility to state reasons for obtaining international protection as well as a precise indication of reasons for the refusal of entry on the entry form. An assessment of the submitted reasons for asylum cannot only depend on an assessment by an interpreter, but must be decided through the responsible authority or court.
The case considered an application against the decision of the Secretary of State refusing to consider the merits of the Claimants’ contentions for asylum, on the basis that Hungary was considered to be a “safe” country that would presumably comply with its EU and international legal obligations. The Claimants argued that they would be at risk of refoulement to Iran if removed to Hungary, in breach of their rights under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Claimants further argued that along the way, they would be at risk of detention in conditions and circumstances amounting to an unlawful violation of their fundamental right to freedom and liberty under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. The court held that removal of the Claimants to Hungary gives rise to a real risk of chain refoulement to Iran. However, there was insufficient evidence to make out breach of Article 5 ECHR.