Case summaries
The appeal authority is obliged to assess the case on the basis of all the evidence and to provide proper grounds for its decision. It is not sufficient, therefore, to state in general terms that the second-instance authority shares the position of the head of the Polish Office for Foreigners and the arguments put forward by him. If the principle of two-instance administrative proceedings is to be observed, it is not enough to assert that two decisions by two authorities of different rank were issued in the given case.
This case concerned the assessment and reason given that the Applicant had not been subjected to “serious harm” in the past, in circumstances where the decision was unclear as to whether the finding was to the effect that his account was not believed, or whether, if believed, the harm was not inflicted by persons who were "actors of serious harm". The Court also considered the definition of “actors of serious harm.” Thirdly, the Court considered whether the decision-maker ignored the specific claim made in the application that returned asylum seekers face a risk of detention, interrogation and torture such as would amount to "serious harm".
The third action in a row brought by a foreign woman for refugee status ended in the issue of a judgment dismissing the case as it was found that the basis for the application was the same as in the previous cases and the application was therefore inadmissible. The Court overturned the negative decision by the Polish Council for Refugees, as the new application by the foreign woman stated that she had divorced her then husband and had been in a relationship for a year with a Polish citizen, which might cause persecution on religious grounds were she to return to her country of origin.
Article L. 712(1) (b) of the CESEDA requires the asylum judge to examine whether the circumstances allow the risks referred to in this provision to be regarded as proven. The protection provided for in this Article is only granted where there is a real, rather than possible, risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of a return to the Applicant’s country of origin.
The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.
The conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the B. and D. judgment that, based on the description of Hizb-e Wahdat in the official report as a violent organisation, a policy of presuming 'personal and knowing participation' on the part of aliens who have fulfilled specific roles within the organisation is consistent with Article 12(2) of the Qualification Directive.
When the asylum claim of an applicant has not been individually assessed, the National Court of Asylum has to cancel the asylum refusal decision and the asylum claim has to be reassessed by the OFPRA.
The real risk of suffering the type of serious harm envisaged in Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive (torture and inhuman or degrading treatment) may be established by an Applicant who proves that he is a member of a group systematically targeted for such harm and who does not put forward any other circumstances relating to his individual case.
French associations challenged an internal memo from the OFPRA (3 November 2011). The Council of State suspended the execution of that memo.
The case relates to the detention and proposed deportation from Belgium of an irregularly present Cameroonian national suffering from HIV.
The Court unanimously found that her deportation to Cameroon would not violate Article 2 or Article 3 ECHR. However, she had not been able to effectively challenge the deportation decision, in violation of Article 13.
The Court found a violation of Article 3 based on the lack of appropriate treatment while she was detained. Further, the additional period of detention following interim measures by the Court preventing her removal, was unlawful and violated Article 5(1)f).