Case summaries

General information about the country of origin indicating that returning refugees (in Kabul) often end up subjected to degrading conditions must be taken into consideration in determining the reasonableness of an internal protection alternative (IPA). If not, then the constitutional, judicial obligation to give reasons is breached. 

This case concerned forced child labour in ther country of origin and sexual exploitation of the daughter of an Ethiopian father and an Eritrean mother, strained relations between the two countries, mass expulsions on the basis of ethnic origin, absence of a family network in the country of origin, total illiteracy, unequal treatment of single women, and an inability to integrate into society.

In relation to the absence of a family network, the case considered the stigma which may be suffered as a member of the particular social group of “single women in Ethiopia”.

Should she return to Ethiopia, it was considered likely that the Applicant would be totally ostracised to such an extent that she would be unable to integrate into society and enjoy her legal rights.

The case concerns the examination of an asylum claim by the Austrian authorities and assessment of a real risk that the applicant would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR if expelled to Russia. 

This was a decision of the Polish Refugee Board of 31 January 2013 to uphold that part of the decision of the Head of the Polish Office for Foreigners which concerned refusal to accord refugee status and to overturn the remainder of the decision as well as to grant subsidiary protection.

In the course of criminal proceedings conducted against a foreigner in Poland it was revealed to Iranian consular officials that the foreigner concerned was being held at the Centre for Foreigners seeking refugee status in Dębak. This could have been tantamount to disclosing that the foreigner was applying for refugee status in Poland. Although it is not known whether the foreigner would have suffered repression from the authorities upon returning to Iran, such a possibility cannot be excluded. This circumstance does not fall within the concept of particular social group. However, considering the scale of human rights abuses in Iran and the unpredictability of the regime, there exists a real threat of torture or of inhuman or degrading treatment.

When assessing the application for international protection the Ministry of Interior (MI) did not take into account the Applicant’s youth, lack of education and background. The MI did not conduct the procedure and pose questions in a manner that was suitable to the Applicant’s age and personality.

The country of origin information that the Applicant submitted only in his appeal against the decision should be accepted as this is generally available information that MI could have obtained on its own.

The appeal authority is obliged to assess the case on the basis of all the evidence and to provide proper grounds for its decision. It is not sufficient, therefore, to state in general terms that the second-instance authority shares the position of the head of the Polish Office for Foreigners and the arguments put forward by him. If the principle of two-instance administrative proceedings is to be observed, it is not enough to assert that two decisions by two authorities of different rank were issued in the given case.

This case concerned the assessment and reason given that the Applicant had not been subjected to “serious harm” in the past, in circumstances where the decision was unclear as to whether the finding was to the effect that his account was not believed, or whether, if believed, the harm was not inflicted by persons who were "actors of serious harm". The Court also considered the definition of “actors of serious harm.” Thirdly, the Court considered whether the decision-maker ignored the specific claim made in the application that returned asylum seekers face a risk of detention, interrogation and torture such as would amount to "serious harm".

The third action in a row brought by a foreign woman for refugee status ended in the issue of a judgment dismissing the case as it was found that the basis for the application was the same as in the previous cases and the application was therefore inadmissible. The Court overturned the negative decision by the Polish Council for Refugees, as the new application by the foreign woman stated that she had divorced her then husband and had been in a relationship for a year with a Polish citizen, which might cause persecution on religious grounds were she to return to her country of origin.

Article L. 712(1) (b) of the CESEDA requires the asylum judge to examine whether the circumstances allow the risks referred to in this provision to be regarded as proven. The protection provided for in this Article is only granted where there is a real, rather than possible, risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of a return to the Applicant’s country of origin. 

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.