Case summaries
In some cases of severe illness Art. 3 ECHR precludes a deportation even though a treatment in the state of origin is possible. If the appellant cannot bear the costs of the treatment or the necessary concomitant medication the renewed increase of the illness and therefore a real life-threatening risk is probable which precludes the deportation of the applicant.
The applicants’ detention under Article 5 (1) was arbitrary and did not ensure the principle of legal certainty; lack of information was contrary to Article 5 (2) and impaired their ability to challenge the detention decisions in violation of 5 (4). The conditions at the reception centre and the boats did not amount to a violation of Article 3, as the applicants’ stay was very short and there were not sufficient indications.
There was no violation of Article 4 Protocol 4, as the applicants have had a genuine and effective possibility during the entire procedure to raise concerns regarding obstacles to their return to Tunisia; there was similarly no violation of Article 4 Protocol 4 in conjunction with Article 13, since the applicants’ complain would solely relate on the collective nature of their expulsion and not to any real risk of treatment contrary to Article 2 & 3 in Tunisia.
This case dealt with the extent to which in the case of a child the prospect of discrimination could amount to a real risk of persecution sufficient to found a successful asylum claim in a situation where a comparably placed adult would not be at such a risk.
In the course of an asylum procedure, the statements of the asylum seeker have to be assessed integrally. This includes, inter alia, an analysis of (up-to-date) country reports. However, such analysis is not carried out in a sufficient manner where there are only superficial references to the country of origin information. Rather, it is required that the information contained is actually taken into consideration when taking the decision, applied to the specific circumstances of each case and compared to the information provided by the asylum seeker(s).
If this is not the case, there are significant deficiencies in the administrative inquiry and the facts relevant for the decision are not fully established. Therefore, the contested decisions are to be annulled and the matters are to be referred back to the competent authorities for new decisions to be issued since there is no sufficient basis for a decision of an administrative court.
The French National Asylum Court (CNDA) must do a complete assessment of facts and circumstances in deciding whether an applicant should be granted refugee status, or failing that, subsidiary protection. In doing so, it must take into account all the documentation provided by the Applicant in support of the application. In this case, the Applicant’s medical evidence documentation and the evidence relating to the potential risks she is likely to face if she returns to her country (fear of persecution due to imputed political opinions) should have been taken into account.
The CNDA did not consider that evidence and did not include it in its decision.
The applicant had sufficiently established that if returned to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation he would not benefit from an examination of his asylum application in line with procedural guarantees as required by the right to asylum. Such a transfer decision thus violated Article 4 of the Charter.
The transfer of asylum seekers from Belgium to Austria, under the Dublin Regulation, is contrary to the principle of due diligence, because the government has failed to obtain information on the effects of the moratorium of the processing of asylum applications in Austria.
The ECtHR found the detention of a homosexual asylum seeker in Hungary was arbitrary, in violation of Article 5(1) ECHR. In particular, the Court found that the Hungarian authorities had failed to make an individualised assessment and to take into account the applicant’s vulnerability in the detention facility based on his sexual orientation. The Court emphasised that the authorities should exercise special care when deciding on deprivation of liberty in order to avoid situations which may reproduce the plight that forced asylum seekers to flee in the first place.
Limiting the possibility to access classified information to the third country national does not automatically mean that their right to an effective remedy with regard to a return order was infringed. By the same token there has been no infringement of Article 47 of the Charter.
The applicant arrived in Hungary as a child and her affiliation with Falun Gong was not properly adjudicated by the asylum authority (OIN) but her asylum application made as an adult was considered a subsequent one. Relying on Article 5 (3) of the Recast Qualification Directive, the OIN considered that the applicant and her mother were malevolent when joining Falun gong solely to evoke their sur place status. The court ruled that the OIN failed to individually assess the applicant’s claim and quashed the decision.