Case summaries
This case is concerned with whether the decision to deny the asylum application and the subsequently imposed entry ban were justified based on articles 1F(a)-(c). Under these provisions the Secretary of State can raise national security as a ‘serious ground’ for his decision if an element of ‘personal participation’ can be proven.
This case is concerned with whether the Secretary of State for Justice has discharged or breached his duty of care with regards to the risk of refoulement in an asylum application.
While accepting that Hungary is the responsible EU State for processing the applicant's asylum application (Article 18(1) Dublin Regulation III), the Court held that a transfer to Hungary may not occur due to systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in Hungary, that would put the applicant at a serious risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Article 3 para 2 Dublin III) .
An Applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State pending a final decision on his asylum status prevails over the public’s interest in immediate enforcement of an ordered transfer if the appropriate asylum procedure of an Applicant in the country to which the Applicant would be deported cannot be ensured (Hungary).
An Applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State prevails over the public’s interest in deporting the Applicant to the Member State in which the Applicant first sought asylum if there is a predominant degree of likelihood that the Applicant will be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment in the other Member State (e.g. because of significant capacity problems and a change to its asylum law).
An Applicant with Syrian citizenship applied for asylum in Sweden. The Migration Court of Appeal found that (i) Armenia was considered a safe third country, and (ii) that the Applicant had such a connection to Armenia that it was reasonable for the Applicant to go there, given that the Applicant’s mother was from Armenia, Armenian was the Applicant’s native language, the Applicant was born and spent his first years in Armenia, and the Applicant had voluntarily returned to Armenia as an adult to study. The Applicant’s asylum application was rejected.
The presumption that Italy remains in compliance with its EU and International Law obligations related to the reception and integration of asylum seekers and Beneficiaries of International Protection has not been rebutted. Asylum seekers and BIPs suffering from severe psychological trauma can be returned to Italy with no real risk of breaching article 3 ECHR, or 4 CFREU, since the Country's reception capacities have not been exceeded, while effective medical treatment is available under the same terms as to Italian nationals.
The Applicant appealed a decision ordering his transfer to another Member State responsible for examining his application for international protection because the six-month period during which his transfer had to be carried out in accordance with Regulation (EU) no. 604/2013 known as “Dublin III” (the “Dublin III Regulation”) had expired.
The Council of State denied the appeal holding that the six-month period was interrupted by the legal action against the transfer measure but had not restarted because the appeal was still pending when the Préfet issued the Dublin III summons to the Applicant.
Art. 2 lit. (n) of the Dublin III Regulation requires objective criteria defined by domestic law for the ‘risk of absconding’, which is a necessary requirement for the imposition of detention pending transfer according to Art. 28 (2) of the Dublin III Regulation.
The domestic legal provision of § 76 (2) FPG lacks the necessary objective criteria defined by law for the ‘risk of absconding’ according to the Dublin III Regulation and is therefore not a sufficient legal basis for detention pending deportation in a transfer procedure according to Art. 28 (2) Dublin III Regulation.
An applicant’s interest in remaining in a Member State pending a decision on their right to remain will prevail if, due to a lack of knowledge about the actual living situation of refugees in the third country and negative public reports regarding such situations, there can be no assurance that the applicant will be safe in said third country.