Case summaries

CJEU rules that Hungarian national law which defines ‘serious crime’ (in the context of exclusion from subsidiary protection) as a crime with a possible custodial of 5 years sentence as incompatible with the Qualification Directive. Instead, each crime must be looked at on an individual basis to ascertain its “seriousness”.  

Where a person is registered with UNRWA and then later applies for international protection in a European Union Member State such persons are in principle excluded from refugee status in the European Union unless it becomes evident, on the basis of an individualised assessment of all relevant evidence, that their personal safety is at serious risk and it is impossible for UNRWA to guarantee that the living conditions are compatible with its mission and that due to these circumstances the individual has been forced to leave the UNRWA area of operations. 

The fact that a person has been the subject, in the past, of a decision excluding him from refugee status cannot automatically permit the finding that the mere presence of that person in the territory of the host Member State constitutes a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society. A case-by-case assessment is necessary before a measure based on grounds of public policy or public security is adopted. This assessment includes weighing the threat against the protection of the rights of EU citizens and their family members.

Similarly, in order to adopt an expulsion decision with due regard to the principle of proportionality, account must be taken of, inter alia, the nature and gravity of the alleged conduct of the individual concerned, the duration and, when appropriate, the legality of his residence in the host Member State, the period of time that has elapsed since that conduct, the individual’s behaviour during that period, the extent to which he currently poses a danger to society, and the solidity of social, cultural and family links with the host Member State.

The Council of State annulled the decision from the French national court on asylum (CNDA) after noting it had not examined the applicant’s submission that he did not have access to an interpreter during his personal interview for a re-examination of his asylum application. He had indeed appealed against the decision of the French immigration authorities (OFPRA) rejecting his claim despite his inability to be understood.

The applicant’s asylum claim has been rejected on the grounds of Article 1F(c) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. The act he committed would amount to being contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. However, the Council of State hereby decided that in failing to seek and qualify the severity of this act in the light of its effects internationally, the lower court made an error of law.

An asylum applicant who was a victim of previous persecution in their country of origin can be granted refugee status under article 1, C 5) of the Geneva Convention. This is because, due to the severity of the treatment applied, the applicant’s fear is exacerbated to such an extent that, even if the persecution has ceased to exist, a return to the country of origin would be unthinkable. 

After having committed several offences qualified as being of a ‘particular gravity’, Mr.O’s refugee status was revoked on April 21st 2006.

Upon appeal to the Council of Alien Law Litigation (‘CALL’), the question of the validity of article 55/3/1 of December 15th 1980 law (the ‘1980 Law’) arose. Although it is established that this provision is transposing article 14(4) of the Directive 2011/95/EU, its compatibility with the Geneva Convention must be verified.

The Council refuses then to pronounce itself on the question, arguing the competency of such matter is vested in the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The applicant, who had deserted the Syrian army, was seen in isolation covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) [refugee status]. However, the Board found serious reasons to assume that the applicant had committed a crime against humanity and war crimes during his military service and consequently he was excluded from protection. Nevertheless, the Danish Aliens Act Art. 31, (2) is an obstacle to his expulsion as he would risk persecution covered by the Danish Aliens Act Art. 7 (1) in the case of returning to Syria.

The CJEU in this case expanded on its previous ruling of B & D. Whereas previously the scope of the exclusion clause for those engaging in terrorist acts was limited to engaging in, conspiring to or planning an actual act of terrorism with an international dimension, the CJEU has now widened the scope to include those who provide logistical support even where no act of terrorism takes place. 

The Administrative Chamber of the Spanish Supreme Court decides on the inadmissibility of the appeal an applicant for international protection submitted of a judgement that denied him the right of asylum and subsidiary protection.

The Supreme Court concludes there is no legal reasoning to admit the appeal, because what the National Court concluded was well-founded.