Case summaries

Article 27(1) of the Dublin Regulation is to be interpreted as meaning that an applicant for international protection may rely, in the context of an action brought against a decision to transfer him, on the expiry of a period laid down in Article 21(1) of that regulation, even if the requested Member State is willing to take charge of that applicant.

The two-month period for submitting a take charge request where there has been a Eurodac hit is not cumulative with the general three-month period for take charge requests.

An application for international protection is deemed to have been lodged if a written document, prepared by a public authority and certifying that a third-country national has requested international protection, has reached the authority responsible for implementing the obligations arising from that regulation, and as the case may be, if only the main information contained in such a document, but not that document or a copy thereof, has reached that authority.

A waiver to file an appeal against custody prior to deportation is only possible under strict conditions. Particularly there has to be a qualified legal representation when signing the waiver.

The risk of absconding in the sense of Art. 76a Residence Act cannot be assumed because of the mere fact that another state is responsible for the asylum procedure of that person.

The right to have recourse to the courts as enshrined in the German constitution (Art. 19 ss. 4 GG) is to be assessed in a thorough and reliable manner if the right to physical integrity (Art. 2 ss. 2 GG and Art. 3 of the ECHR) is at stake. The courts only adhere to this obligation if they carefully assess the evidence brought to them by the applicant considering the specific context of a person who has been granted international protection in a third country. 

An application to suspend the effects of a decision, contained in an appeal of a decision ordering return and a ban from re-entering the territory of Poland and other Schengen area states should be allowed, due to the validity of the Applicant remaining in Poland pending the conclusion of the administrative court proceedings. Under art. 61 § 3 of the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, the Court may, upon the application of the Appellant, order that the challenged decision be suspended, in whole or in part, if the act or function to be performed would result in a risk of significant harm or other consequences which are difficult to reverse.

The Judge of liberty and detention of the Toulouse Appeal Court considered that an extension of the applicant’s administrative detention could mean subjecting her to imminent forcible return to her country of origin, which was not compatible with articles 3 and 13 ECHR since a non-suspensive appeal against a decision rejecting the applicant’s asylum application was still pending and with sufficient grounds.

As a result, the Judge held that there was no reason to extend the duration of the applicant’s administrative detention.

The Judge of liberty and detention of the Toulouse Appeal Court considered that an extension of the applicant’s administrative detention would mean subjecting her to imminent forcible return to her country of origin, which was not compatible with articles 3 and 13 ECHR since an appeal against a decision rejecting the applicant’s asylum application was still pending and with sufficient grounds.

As a result, the Judge held that there was no reason to extend the duration of the applicant’s administrative detention.

The Court quashed the decision of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN). The OIN based its decision on classified information obtained from the Constitutional Protection Office (CPO), which stated that the Applicant poses a threat to Hungary’s national security, and that he shall not be granted protection, with due regard to Article 1 f) c) of the Geneva Convention. The OIN failed to communicate the CPO’s opinion to the Applicant for nine months. The Court assessed that the proceedings were ‘exceptionally unlawful’.

The application of S.C. and her minor children Z.C. and F.C. related to the cassation of an Appeal Court judgement regarding compensation for the harm they suffered as a result of an indisputably unjust decision to place the Applicants in a Guarded Detention Centre for Foreigners. The Supreme Court reversed the challenged judgement and passed the case to the Appeal Court for re-consideration. 

1. An application for asylum lodged in Germany only qualifies as a subsequent application within the meaning of section 71a of the Asylum Act, interpreted in conformity with the constitution, if the first asylum procedure in a country that is generally determined to be a safe third country has actually been conducted in compliance with the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
This is not the case, where, at the time of the decision, there have been systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedures of the third country which have put the applicant at risk of an inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Art. 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Art. 3 of the ECHR.

2. The procedure to determine whether a second asylum procedure is to be conducted also requires a personal interview of the applicant. Such an interview is only dispensable where the Federal Office of Migration and Refugees (Federal Office) can either decide on the basis of the information received on the merits of the decision whether the new application constitutes a new submission or assess already on the basis of the detailed written explanations of the applicant reliably and safely that the submission is clearly and manifestly inconsistent.

Wishing to challenge his transfer to Germany from Luxembourg, the applicant appealed this decision and the court found that, on the basis of CJEU jurisprudence, all individuals had a right to contest the manner in which the Dublin III criteria are applied.