Case summaries

The Dublin regulations do not allow for priority to be given to the processing of different types of transfer applications. In particular, there is no priority which favours a transfer application made on the Applicant’s own initiative as compared to one which is ordered by administrative compulsion. In deciding the application, the executing authority must allow the Applicant to transfer without administrative compulsion if it appears certain that (i) the Applicant will voluntarily travel to the Member State responsible for reviewing his application and, (ii) will report in a timely manner to the responsible authority. A transfer without administrative compulsion is not a deportation (Abschiebung), and therefore does not result in a statutory ban on entry and residence under Sec. 11 of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz).

The applicant’ s description of a situation which gives rise to a risk to his life or physical integrity, deriving from gender-based violence, social or religious group violence, family/domestic violence, which is accepted, tolerated or not tackled by the State, imposes an ex proprio motu further investigation upon the Judiciary. The latter entails an investigation into the control of  violence described by the applicant in terms of whether it is widespread, whether there is impunity for the acts as well as the State’s response

The Minister based a subsidiary protection decision and deportation order examination on the premise that the Applicant was a Tanzanian national based on records that were provided by the UK Border Agency to that effect, in circumstances where the Applicant claimed that he was Somali; that the Tanzanian identity was false; and he claimed that two language reports which were supportive of his claim of Somali nationality and submitted in a separate application for a subsequent asylum claim should have been considered by the Minister in the making of his subsidiary protection and deportation decisions.

The High Court held that the language reports were added to the decision making process by virtue of being referenced in (but not attached to) correspondence concerning the subsidiary protection application and representations against deportation; that they were not considered by the Minister; and that the failure to do so breached the Applicant’s right to a fresh consideration of his credibility, and the Minister’s obligation to consider relevant facts.

Consequently the subsidiary protection decision and the deportation were quashed and remitted.

The legal proceedings relating to an appeal regarding the granting of international protection are a summary process that give the judge certain official powers. As a consequence, the judge should decide on the merits of an appeal even if the Applicant fails to attend the hearing.

It is the duty of the Applicant to show that he has been persecuted or is at serious risk of persecution. He should describe that persecution and present it to the fullest extent possible, showing how it relates to him in particular. Lack of acceptance by one’s family, social ostracism, and the negative perception of people of a different sexual orientation do not constitute grounds for according refugee status. However, given that the foreigner’s illness (AIDS) is at a very advanced stage and that he is undergoing treatment for epilepsy, it is necessary to consider whether deportation to his country of origin would violate his right to life.

When assessing the application for international protection the Ministry of Interior (MI) did not take into account the Applicant’s youth, lack of education and background. The MI did not conduct the procedure and pose questions in a manner that was suitable to the Applicant’s age and personality.

The country of origin information that the Applicant submitted only in his appeal against the decision should be accepted as this is generally available information that MI could have obtained on its own.

This case involved recognition of refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on grounds of religious beliefs.

More specifically, it was held that the arrest and torture the Applicant suffered at the hands of his father and the State authorities because of his Christian faith, the risk of being executed for apostasy because he was baptised in Greece, and the risk of being arrested and maltreated again should he return to Iran, constituted persecution under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the actor of persecution being the State. Furthermore, being forced to conceal one's religious beliefs and/or proclaim belief in another religionin order to avoid persecution and/or deprivation of basic rights constitutes a breach of religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR and also the related case law of the ECtHR.

According to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Slovenia the general credibility of the Applicant is an internationally recognised standard that takes into account numerous conditions when assessing the Applicant’s level of credibility, who does not have any material evidence to prove his persecution. However, the Applicant’s general credibility will provide the necessary trust in his statement as regards his persecution for the state to grant him international protection even without any material or other evidence, merely on the basis of his statements. 

The Appellant should have demanded for an expert to be appointed already during the administrative procedure, at the very latest during the appeal. According to the Supreme Court the objection that a psychiatric expert was not appointed represents an impermissible appeal novelty. The Supreme Court also added that the psychological health of the parties in court procedures is assumed as a fact. 

1. Changes in the home country are only considered to be sufficiently significant and non-temporary if the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded.
2. Based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which applies to the concept of “real risk” according to Article 3 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), a uniform standardof probability is applied to assessing the likelihood of persecution in the context of refugee protection; this corresponds to the standard of substantial probability.