Case summaries

The Supreme Court of Ireland handed down a judgment concerning the question whether the Minister for Justice and Equality is obliged to revoke a deportation order or otherwise facilitate a person to enter the State, when that person has been granted consent to make a subsequent application for international protection under section 22 of the International Protection Act 2015, which requires the person's presence in the State to make the application. It was held that there is no express right to enter the State for the purposes of making an application, save where the person is at its frontiers.

The Return Directive does not preclude Member States from introducing legislation that imposes a custodial sentence on individuals for whom the return procedure has been exahusted but still remain in the territory, where the criminal act consists in an unlawful stay with notice of an entry ban, issued in particular on account of that third-country national’s criminal record or the threat he represents to public policy or national security.

However, such a provision in national legislation is permitted if the criminal act is not defined as a breach of such an entry ban and the legislation itself is sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application in order to avoid all risk of arbitrariness.

The Court concluded that Italy had already accepted the take back request and therefore Portugal should proceed with the applicant’s transfer in accordance with the Dublin Regulation III. Since Italy had already rejected the applicant’s first request for international protection there, it should be the one responsible for returning the applicant back to their home country.

As the applicant is not a vulnerable person, the transfer order to Italy does not violate the non-refoulement principle.

EU law does not preclude national legislation that allows an illegally staying third-country national to be detained in prison accommodation for removal, on the ground that he poses a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society or the internal or external security of the Member State concerned. The detainee should be kept separated from ordinary prisoners.

Slovakian authorities provided information and interpretation and there are no indications that these were inadequate to the extent of impairing the individual’s access to asylum. The applicant’s return to Ukraine was conducted in the context of a readmission framework and there was no reason for Slovakian authorities to be particularly alert regarding potential human rights violations in Ukraine.

However, there has been a procedural violation of Article 3 of the Convention by Ukraine on account of the Ukrainian authorities’ failure to examine the applicant’s claims of fear of persecution in Afghanistan properly before returning him there. Moreover, there has been a violation of Article 5 §§ 2 and 4 of the Convention by Ukraine.

1. A change of the destination country in a return decision by an administrative authority should be regarded as a new return decision requiring an effective remedy in compliance with Article 47 CFREU.

2. The national legislation providing for a safe transit country ground applicable in the present case is contrary to EU law.

3. The obligation imposed on a third-country national to remain permanently in a closed and limited transit zone, within which their movement is limited and monitored, and which the latter cannot legally leave voluntarily, in any direction whatsoever, constitutes a deprivation of liberty, characterised as "detention" within the meaning of the Reception Conditions (RCD) and Returns Directives (RD).

4. Neither the RCD nor Article 43 of the Asylum Procedures Directive authorise detention in transit zones for a period exceeding four weeks.

5. Detention under the RCD and the RD must comply with the relevant guarantees under EU law including being based on a reasoned detention decision; consisting of a measure of last resort, following an individualised assessment of the case, its necessity and proportionality; and effective judicial review should be available. An applicant for international protection cannot be held in detention solely on the ground that they cannot support themselves. Where detention is found to contravene EU law, domestic courts may release the applicant and order the authorities to provide accommodation in line with the RCD provisions. They are empowered to do so, even if they have no clear jurisdiction under national law.

Not all cases with an international element can establish jurisdiction under the Convention; an assessment of exceptional circumstances on the basis of the specific facts of each case is required.

The applicants do not have any connecting links with Belgium and their sole presence in the premises of the Belgian Embassy in Lebanon cannot establish jurisdiction, as they were never under the de facto control of Belgian diplomatic or consular agents. Jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR cannot be established solely on the basis of an administrative procedure initiated by private individuals outside the territory of the chosen state, without them having any connection with that State, nor any treaty obligation compelling them to choose that state.

The standardised nature of the questions to the applicants and similarities in the responses recorded do not necessarily indicate a lack of individualised assessment. The applicants were not deprived of an opportunity to submit arguments against their expulsion and did not make any claim of persecution risks in their country of origin. No collective expulsion under Article 4 Protocol 4 has been established.

Similarly, no violation of Article 4 Protocol 4 in conjunction with Article 13 has been established, as the claim cannot be considered arguable.

Due to the COVID-19 health crisis, and especially the cancellation of flights to the applicant’s country of origin, the continuation of immigration detention is no longer required because an effective return cannot be considered anymore as a reasonable perspective.