Case summaries

The three-month time limit for take back requests, as prescribed by Article 21(1) of the Dublin III Regulation, will apply as soon as the competent authorities of the relevant Member State have been informed, with certainty, of the fact that international protection has been requested. Where certain responsibilities for the registration of applications have been delegated to a competent legal entity, the authorities will be deemed to have been so informed once the legal entity in question has made a written record of the applicant’s intention to claim asylum. 

When a Dublin transfer does not take place within the six-month time limit prescribed in the Dublin III Regulation, responsibility for examining the application for international protection is automatically shifted to the Member State that requested the Dublin transfer. Moreover, the Court extends the scope of the right to an effective remedy provided in the Dublin III Regulation, specifying that an applicant for international protection can challenge a Dublin transfer before a national court by invoking the expiry of the prescribed six-month time limit.

The Court rejected the Applicant's challenges to the respondent's decision to certify his asylum claim and deport him, on the grounds (i) of his mistaken assessment of his probable situation if deported to Italy, (ii) of his misreading of the Dublin III Regulation, specifically insofar as it applies to effective remedy.   

In its decision, the tribunal defined the concept of ‘written’ according to the Dublin III Regulation. It also found that the a couple who were engaged did not constitute a family (according to the Regulation) unless they got engaged in their country of origin. Finally, the tribunal found that the sovereignty clause only afforded power to the State which was exercising it under the supervision of the administrative judge. 

Wishing to challenge his transfer to Germany from Luxembourg, the applicant appealed this decision and the court found that, on the basis of CJEU jurisprudence, all individuals had a right to contest the manner in which the Dublin III criteria are applied. 

On the basis of CJEU jurisprudence, the administrative tribunal found that all asylum applicants have a right to appeal the manner in which the responsibility criteria of Dublin III has been applied to their individual case and the determination of a responsible Member State where there are systemic deficiencies. 

The following question is referred to the CJEU under the expedited procedure provided for in Article 105 of the Rules of Procedure:

Does Article 26 of the Dublin Regulation III prevent the competent authorities in a Member State, who have requested another Member State to take responsibility under a take back or take charge request of an applicant who has applied for international protection (which has not yet been ruled definitely upon) or any other person caught by Article 18(1)(c) or (d), from taking a transfer decision and notifying the applicant before the requested State has accepted the take back or take charge request?

The Office of Immigration and Nationality issued a decision on the responsibility of the Republic of Bulgaria under the Dublin III Regulation, without having informed the Applicant about the applicability of the Regulation in his case. The Court quashed the decision and declared the Applicant’s right to be heard was not respected.

The Constitutional Court ruled that Member States are obliged to examine all circumstances which are important from the perspective of the principle of non-refoulement, when deciding on a Dublin transfer to a responsible Member State. Due to the absolute nature of the protection afforded by the principle of non-refoulement, the assessment must take into account all the circumstances of the particular case, including the applicant's personal situation in the transferring country. In this context, it should also be assessed whether the mere removal of an individual to another country due to their health status is contrary to the requirements arising from the principle of non-refoulement. Thus, when the Supreme Court did not consider the circumstances that are important in terms of respect of the principle of non-refoulement, it infringed the applicants' right to equal protection under article 22 of the Constitution.