Case summaries

Appeal against the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order's negative decision no 95/52986 of 28.4.2006 on a claim for asylum before the Appeal Committees formed pursuant to Articles 26 & 32 of Presidential Decree 114/2010 and the Minister of Citizen Protection's decision 5401/3-505533 of 7.11.2011 (385/8-11-2011 FEK YODD) pursuant to which the present Committee was formed.

This case involved a fear of persecution because of religious beliefs (atheism) as well as because of membership of a particular social group (personality shaped in a non-Islamic society / westernisation). In particular, the Committee ruled that if the Applicant were to return to Afghanistan now or in the near future, because of his atheism and the consequent non-conformity with the Islamic way of life of the society into which he would need to integrate, in conjunction with the fact that his personality has been shaped in a non-Islamic society with customs and a way of life totally different from those of Muslims, he would be reasonably likely to suffer aggressive social attitudes, threats and social exclusion which, taken cumulatively, could amount to persecution. Besides, should he return to a small rural community in Afghanistan – given the Applicant's particular personality and how it had been shaped – it is very likely that he would not be able to conceal his religious beliefs (atheism) and thus there was a reasonable chance that he would be at risk of criminal prosecution because of his atheism and his 'apostasy' from Islam (prosecution which is reasonably likely to lead to imprisonment or execution). This, however, would constitute a direct and severe violation of his fundamental right to religious freedom, especially in the context of the specific social, religious and political unrest and the absence of legal guarantees in the Applicant's country of origin.

It was held that even if he were not criminally prosecuted, the Applicant would, in any case, be at risk of suffering harm from non-state actors in the form of persecution; and that the Afghan State, police and other authorities were incapable of providing adequate and effective protection, mainly because of the lack of organisation and the corruption which prevails at all levels.

Refugee status was granted to a Kosovar family of Roma origin based on their ethnicity being recognised as a particular social group. The court found that they faced a risk of persecution and that state protection was either unavailable or ineffective.

An applicant from Guinea was recognised as a refugee. The court found that because of his homosexuality he faced a threat of persecution from family members. The State was unwilling or unable to provide protection.

The Supreme Court does not consider an assessment of the Applicant as an untrustworthy person to be justifiable where it is based only on the fact that he failed to mention all of the details of the case immediately in the admission interview, providing them gradually instead, as the Applicant‘s claims are logical, consistent, and in line with the situation in the country of origin. The argument of untrustworthiness can be used only in situations where there are additional factors indicating that the facts asserted by the Applicant are not true, and that has not been demonstrated in the case in question.

The fact that riots took place in poorer neighbourhoods which resulted in sudden police charges to dispel the riots is insufficient for the application of Art 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.

The case concerned the interested party's obligation to cite specific facts which can provide evidence that the conditions for falling within the scope of the 1951 Convention had been satisfied. There must be a thorough examination of the main claims and a full justification of any negative decision in the case. If the Minister for Public Order adopts the Committee's negative judgment, then the relevant document must cite not only the interested party's claims but also the questions which were put to the foreigner and the responses he gave. The contested order – based on a defective opinion – referred in general terms to the Applicant not having shown a risk of persecution on racial, political or other grounds, and is deficiently reasoned. The application for annulment was granted.

The applicant was recognised as a refugee because of a threat of forced marriage in Afghanistan. The court found that rights violations resulting from forced marriage, including the use of physical and psychological violence, constitute severe violations of basic human rights according to Art. 9 (1) (b) of the Qualification Directive. The applicant belonged to the particular social group of "unmarried women from families whose traditional self-image demands a forced marriage." The Afghan State is neither willing nor able to protect women against persecution in case of forced marriage. Internal protection was not available to the applicant.

When presented with a detailed story that is logical, free from internal contradictions and accords with the social and political situation in the country of origin as described in international reports, the statements of the Applicant have to be deemed to be credible and therefore international protection has to be granted.

Refugee status was granted on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution based on the applicant facing  a second act of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) on return to Somalia (persecution ground: membership of a particular social group).