Case summaries

The case examined the allegations of the applicants that their deportation to Moscow will entail a real risk of refoulement to Afghanistan where they fear treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.  Further, it examined the applicants’ complaints of a violation of their right to an effective remedy in conjunction with Article 3, invoking Article 13 of the Convention.

The European Court of Human Rights held that the expulsion of an Algerian national from Slovakia to Algeria, in contempt of an interim measure issued by the Court, was in violation of Articles 3, 13 and 34 of the Convention.

The notion of “well-founded fear” has not been precisely defined. However, it is commonly accepted that it must necessarily contain two elements: a subjective element (the party has a real and credible fear of persecution) and an objective element (this fear has a basis in reality).  A person applying for refugee status should present facts and possibly evidence confirming that they were persecuted in the past or that they fear persecution upon returning to their country of origin. Other reasons for a foreigner leaving their country of origin or fearing a return to their country of origin are immaterial as regards recognition of their refugee status.

This case concerned the conditions under which a refusal to perform military service for conscientious reasons may justify granting refugee status. The Minister for Public Order did not give reasons for deviating from the competent Committee's recommendation, nor did he find it to be ambiguous or to have any other legal defect, while he could have referred the case back to that body for reassessment. The application for annulment is granted.

The Applicant was a homosexual male from Iran who had renounced Islam and was studying the catechism of the Roman Catholic doctrine. It was held that the Applicant had no well-founded (objective) fear of persecution on the grounds of changing his religious beliefs.

Regarding the risks associated with his sexual orientation, the fear that the Applicant expressed was deemed to be well-founded, and it was held that not externalising his sexual orientation to avoid danger would, in and of itself, constitute serious harm to his right to respect for his private life and his right to not be discriminated against. Therefore, his refugee status was recognised and he was granted the international protection in the form of refugee status.

This case involved recognition of refugee status under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention on grounds of religious beliefs.

More specifically, it was held that the arrest and torture the Applicant suffered at the hands of his father and the State authorities because of his Christian faith, the risk of being executed for apostasy because he was baptised in Greece, and the risk of being arrested and maltreated again should he return to Iran, constituted persecution under Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the actor of persecution being the State. Furthermore, being forced to conceal one's religious beliefs and/or proclaim belief in another religionin order to avoid persecution and/or deprivation of basic rights constitutes a breach of religious freedom under Article 9 of the ECHR and also the related case law of the ECtHR.

Article L. 712(1) (b) of the CESEDA requires the asylum judge to examine whether the circumstances allow the risks referred to in this provision to be regarded as proven. The protection provided for in this Article is only granted where there is a real, rather than possible, risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of a return to the Applicant’s country of origin. 

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.  

1. Changes in the home country are only considered to be sufficiently significant and non-temporary if the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded.
2. Based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which applies to the concept of “real risk” according to Article 3 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), a uniform standardof probability is applied to assessing the likelihood of persecution in the context of refugee protection; this corresponds to the standard of substantial probability. 

When establishing the necessary “density of danger” in an internal armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act/Art. 15 (c) Qualification Directive, it is not sufficient to quantitatively determine the number of victims in the conflict. It is necessary to carry out an “evaluating overview” of the situation, which takes into account the situation of the health system. However, this issue was not decisive in the present case, as the applicant would only face a low risk of being seriously harmed.