Case summaries

Article L. 712(1) (b) of the CESEDA requires the asylum judge to examine whether the circumstances allow the risks referred to in this provision to be regarded as proven. The protection provided for in this Article is only granted where there is a real, rather than possible, risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the event of a return to the Applicant’s country of origin. 

The actual risk of inhuman treatment or punishment by the Taliban because of desertion from one of their forced recruitment training camps can justify a deportation ban according to clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act (Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive) in the case of Afghanistan.
Targeted criminal violence is defined in Article 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (2) of the Residence Act) but not in Article 15 (c) of the Qualification Directive (clause 60 (7) p. 2 of the Residence Act), because in this context there is no specific risk of an internal armed conflict, i.e. “indiscriminate violence”.  

1. Changes in the home country are only considered to be sufficiently significant and non-temporary if the refugee’s fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded.
2. Based on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which applies to the concept of “real risk” according to Article 3 ECHR (European Convention on Human Rights), a uniform standardof probability is applied to assessing the likelihood of persecution in the context of refugee protection; this corresponds to the standard of substantial probability. 

When establishing the necessary “density of danger” in an internal armed conflict within the meaning of Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act/Art. 15 (c) Qualification Directive, it is not sufficient to quantitatively determine the number of victims in the conflict. It is necessary to carry out an “evaluating overview” of the situation, which takes into account the situation of the health system. However, this issue was not decisive in the present case, as the applicant would only face a low risk of being seriously harmed.

Appeal against the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order's negative decision no 95/52986 of 28.4.2006 on a claim for asylum before the Appeal Committees formed pursuant to Articles 26 & 32 of Presidential Decree 114/2010 and the Minister of Citizen Protection's decision 5401/3-505533 of 7.11.2011 (385/8-11-2011 FEK YODD) pursuant to which the present Committee was formed.

This case involved a fear of persecution because of religious beliefs (atheism) as well as because of membership of a particular social group (personality shaped in a non-Islamic society / westernisation). In particular, the Committee ruled that if the Applicant were to return to Afghanistan now or in the near future, because of his atheism and the consequent non-conformity with the Islamic way of life of the society into which he would need to integrate, in conjunction with the fact that his personality has been shaped in a non-Islamic society with customs and a way of life totally different from those of Muslims, he would be reasonably likely to suffer aggressive social attitudes, threats and social exclusion which, taken cumulatively, could amount to persecution. Besides, should he return to a small rural community in Afghanistan – given the Applicant's particular personality and how it had been shaped – it is very likely that he would not be able to conceal his religious beliefs (atheism) and thus there was a reasonable chance that he would be at risk of criminal prosecution because of his atheism and his 'apostasy' from Islam (prosecution which is reasonably likely to lead to imprisonment or execution). This, however, would constitute a direct and severe violation of his fundamental right to religious freedom, especially in the context of the specific social, religious and political unrest and the absence of legal guarantees in the Applicant's country of origin.

It was held that even if he were not criminally prosecuted, the Applicant would, in any case, be at risk of suffering harm from non-state actors in the form of persecution; and that the Afghan State, police and other authorities were incapable of providing adequate and effective protection, mainly because of the lack of organisation and the corruption which prevails at all levels.

The case concerned the interested party's obligation to cite specific facts which can provide evidence that the conditions for falling within the scope of the 1951 Convention had been satisfied. There must be a thorough examination of the main claims and a full justification of any negative decision in the case. If the Minister for Public Order adopts the Committee's negative judgment, then the relevant document must cite not only the interested party's claims but also the questions which were put to the foreigner and the responses he gave. The contested order – based on a defective opinion – referred in general terms to the Applicant not having shown a risk of persecution on racial, political or other grounds, and is deficiently reasoned. The application for annulment was granted.

This was an appeal against the rejection of an application for asylum before the Appeal Committees formed pursuant to Articles 26 and 32 of Presidential Decree 114/2010; and against the Minister for Citizen Protection's decisions 5401/3-498356 dated 11.2.2011 and 4000/1/67-f dated 18.5.2011. The rejection of the application (and the legal consequences arising from the rejection) was an excusable error, due to the body issuing the decision having adopted misguided practices. The fear of persecution was based on  membership of a particular social group. The domestic violence endured by the Applicant in the form of psychological stress and physical violence at the hands of her husband, in conjunction with the absence of State protection, constitutes a type of gender based persecution because those actions are detrimental to human dignity and physical integrity. Similarly, her non-conformist behaviour meant that she was exposed to the State's strict laws and practices which imposed disproportionately harsh punishment on women accused of having sexual relations outside marriage.

It was held that the implementation of laws (which may be derived from traditional or cultural norms and practices such as Sharia) which conflict with international human rights standards, and also the disproportionately harsh punishment imposed for non-compliance with a policy or for violation of a law (punishment, indeed, which shows gender based discrimination) could constitute persecution.

The imposition of corporal punishment by judicial and administrative authorities is contrary to the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Applicant's disproportionately harsh punishment by whipping or even stoning is considered to be torture and constitutes a serious form of persecution since the right to not be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment is a protected right which is not subject to any exceptions. The prohibition of torture (Article 3 of the ECHR and Article 3 of the Convention against Torture) is absolute, and a grave violation of absolute rights is, undeniably, persecution.

The importance of preserving family unity is emphasised, taking into consideration the Final Act of the Conference which adopted the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Preamble to Directive 2004/83/EC.

The court found that a prohibition of deportation under Section 60 (2) of the Residence Act (corresponding to Art. 15 (b) of the Qualification Directive) was established due to the existence of a general risk of persecution in case of return to Syria. The Administrative Court, in their assessment of risk, went far beyond the prevailing case law, particularly that of the High Administrative Courts.

A particular mode of persecution cannot be detected in Syria due to the arbitrariness and the juxtaposition of different intelligence services, whose impact cannot be predicted.

A further deterioration of the situation has occurred in light of recent developments and the bloody suppression of the protest movements.

Currently even persons who have not been politically active in exile are, with considerable probability, at risk of being arrested on return, not only for a short period - they are also at risk of torture and other inhuman treatment.

The question of whether the current situation in Iraq is an internal armed conflict (nationwide or regionally) according to Section 60 (7) (2) Residence Act/Art. 15 (c) Qualification Directive was left open. Even if one assumes that such a conflict takes place, subsidiary protection is only to be granted if the applicant is exposed to a serious and individual threat to life or physical integrity “in the course of” such a conflict. This cannot be established regarding the applicant in the present case.

A foreigner who wishes to be placed under the special protection of refugee status must show the Administration, with reasonable clarity and in an objectively reasoned way, that there are specific facts which cause him to have a fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion. If such substantive claims have not been submitted, but only general, vague or manifestly unfounded claims; or if specific facts have indeed been cited but these do not establish grounds for refugee status, then there is no obligation to give specific reasons for rejecting the application for asylum. The “Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status” issued by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees is non-binding in nature but contains “best practice” for the relevant authorities when examining asylum applications and, in that way, sets out “soft law”. Granting a residence permit on humanitarian grounds falls within the broad discretionary powers of the relevant authority; but it can, exceptionally, be obligatory if the foreigner would – should he be repatriated to the country of origin – be at risk of torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.