Case summaries

This case is concerned with whether an appeal against the lawfulness of an asylum applicant’s detention was allowed. Thus the prejudicial question was formulated questioning whether the measure under article 8(3)(a-b) recast Reception Conditions Directive is valid with regards to the provisions in Article 6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU) subject to Article 5 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

A subsequent application is not admissible unless the interested party presents new facts or elements relating to his personnel situation or to the situation in his country of origin, out of which he could not have had knowledge of previously, and likely, if they have probative value, to modify the appreciation of the legitimacy or the credibility of the application of the interested party.

The director general of OFPRA was right to find that the elements that the applicants presented before him did not significantly increase the probability that they would meet the qualifying conditions to claim protection and that their subsequent applications were inadmissible, without having undertaken a hearing before making the decision on inadmissibility.

The Supreme Court quashed the detention and deportation warrants issued against a citizen from the Congo, following a number of prosedural failures by the Cypriot Government to comply with the Cap. 105 of the Alien and Migration Law and Directive 2008/115/EC, denying him the opportunity for voluntary departure.

The question remains open and needs to be clarified in legal proceedings, whether there are systemic flaws in the Bulgarian asylum procedure and conditions of admission, such as pose a risk of infringement of Article 4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) (cf. Article 3(2) Regulation No. 604/2013(Dublin III)) – in particular in the case of a return under the Dublin system.

The Applicants asked the Administrative Tribunal of Lille (the “Tribunal”) to order the relevant authorities to take urgent interim relief measures to guarantee the fundamental freedoms of the population of the Calais camp.

The Administrative Judge  acceded to several of the applicants’ demands (identification of vulnerable minors, hygiene, cleanliness, emergency vehicle access) and held that the situation in the Calais camp constituted a grave and blatantly illegal breach of the right of the persons residing there not to be subjected to degrading and inhuman treatment.

The applicants, a stateless Palestinian from Syria and two Syrian nationals, had been ordered to be expelled to Syria by the Russian authorities, and were detained in a detention centre in Russia pending this. The Court found that their expulsion to Syria would breach Articles 2 and 3, that Articles 5(4) and 5(1)(f) had been violated with regards to their detention, and that the restrictions on their contact with their representatives had breached Article 34.

The Supreme Court considered the appellant’s appeal against the decision by the defendant Secretary of State, by which his application for a Tier 4 student visa had been rejected, on the ground that the applicant had only provided bank statements covering 22 out of the required 28 days. The court held that the refusal of the appellant’s application was unlawful because according to the process instruction the UK Border Agency should not have rejected his application without previously giving the appellant the opportunity to repair the deficit in his evidence. 

While accepting that Hungary is the responsible EU State for processing the applicant's asylum application (Article 18(1) Dublin Regulation III), the Court held that  a transfer to Hungary may not occur due to systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions in Hungary,  that would  put the applicant at a serious risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Article 3 para 2 Dublin III) .

The Returns Directive does not preclude domestic legislation which provides for a prison sentence as a criminal law penalty for non-EU citizens who unlawfully re-enter the country in breach of an entry ban.

The Court ruled that when deciding whether the subsequent application is admissible, new facts regarding the individual situation of the applicant or her situation in the country of origin as well as change in the situation of the country of origin alone are significant. When examining whether the grounds of the first and the subsequent application are the same, the essence of the facts is important, not the manner in which they are presented.

With regard to the applicant’s argument that in the present case the legal grounds for granting subsidiary protection were not examined, the Court stated that in the decision on discontinuing the procedure because of inadmissibility of the application, the authorities do not rule on refusal of refugee status, therefore there is no self-standing legal basis to examine the grounds for granting subsidiary protection. The present application, as the inadmissible one, could not have led to the in-merit examination of the grounds for granting refugee status and therefore could not have included the examination of the subsidiary protection grounds.